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The present study explored three questions: What is the linking pattern of China’s 
cyber news space? What are the factors that contribute to this pattern? And what is the 
distribution of links in real geographic places?  
The concept of the cyber news space refers to the globally connected networks of 
online news production. It is a tool to understand the spatial distribution of online news 
production and the map of the world as presented in the media.   
This study is a content analysis of news Webpages from China’s four leading 
commercial portals. It sampled about 900 news Webpages during the spring of 2008. 
China’s commercial portals are news aggregators and distributors. They are the 
gatekeepers of China’s cyber news space. On their news Webpages there is one hyperlink 
that leads to the original publisher of the story. These links provide a clue of how news 
 vii
organizations were connected online. The content analysis coded these links and other 
information such as media type, production sites and locations of stories.  
This study found that the there was a pattern of concentration in terms of the 
distribution of links among online news organizations. A multiple regression model was 
used to test the factors that may contribute to this pattern. It was found that geographic 
location of news organizations was such a factor. The more central a news organization 
was located, the more links it attracted from the portals.  
In addition, this study also analyzed the distribution of links among difference 
provinces (or province level administrations) of China. It found that Beijing, Chongqing, 
Guangdong, Jilin, and Shanghai are hubs, while more remote provinces, such as Xinjiang, 
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The cyber news space 
The Internet is the first truly global medium. News organizations from around the 
world now place their products on the same platform. Information flows on this network 
at the speed of light. Anyone with access to the Internet has access to constant news flow. 
The Internet’s power of connecting anyone from anywhere is reshaping news production 
and the news readers’ sense of space.  
 Space is an essential part of news, both in its production and its effects. Every 
story has a production site. Where news is produced reflects the spatial distribution of 
media power. Every news organization has a geographic market. Some serve a small 
town; some are metropolitan; some are national; while a handful of news organizations 
have a global audience. Just like any other industry, news production can be viewed as a 
network of nodes of different sizes. There are hubs (such as New York City), ordinary 
nodes (such as Austin), and by-passed places (such as Lubbock, TX).  
Every news story has a “where” element which helps the readers to locate the 
story in their mental map. Media coverage helps us to cultivate and to maintain a mental 
map of the world. Walter Lippmann (1922) introduced the concept of pseudo-
environment: people actually act in response to their perceptions of the world, not the 
reality. Perhaps a famous New Yorker magazine cover that parodies the New Yorker’s 
mental map of the world offers the best illustration. In it, Manhattan comprises about half 
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of the drawing and on the opposite side of the land is a fairly large California. Between 
the two, all other states are squeezed together and indistinguishable. Far over the Pacific 
are three small pieces of land labeled as Japan, China and Russia. A news medium 
functions as a bridge between “the world outside and the picture in our heads”. Empirical 
studies (McCombs, 2005)  provided evidence of strong media effects, especially for 
things with which people do not have direct experiences. Media hold the power to 
highlight some places while rendering others obscure on our mental maps.  
The Internet penetrates geographic boundaries to bridge remote places. News 
organizations must rethink their markets; after all, everyone now has the potential to 
reach a global audience. Powerful media now possess an easy access to “invade” markets 
formerly protected by distance; meanwhile, relatively weak media also are liberated from 
geographic restraints and can seek audiences from far away. The news readers, with their 
new-found liberty of experiencing global media at their fingertips, are bound to have 
quite different experiences than ever before. If a Chinese and an American learn news 
from the same set of news organizations online, will they share a similar mental map of 
the world? As the Internet reshuffles the geographic distribution of media power, how 
will it reshape people’s sense of space?  
This study proposes the concept of the cyber news space as a tool to understand 
the spatial distribution of news production and the map of the world as presented in the 
media, which may have strong effects on the audiences’ mental map. This concept is 
molded after Castells’ (2000) concept of “the space of flows”. Castells defines the space 
of flows as “the material organization of time-sharing social practices that work through 
flows” (p. 442). It rises as the Internet and other communication systems became central 
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to global networks of production. In the new, digital and universal communication system, 
“flows of capital, flows of information, flows of technology, flows of organizational 
interaction, flows of images, sounds, and symbols” (p. 442) are liberated from geographic 
constrains. Our generic sense of space is space of places, our historically rooted and 
commonly shared experiences about geographic locations. Contrary to that, the “space of 
flows” is not about any specific place, but the network and flows upon it. 
Space of flows does not deny the space of places but rather builds upon it. 
Communication technologies do not render geography irrelevant; they redefine 
geography. “Thus the network of communication is the fundamental spatial configuration: 
places do not disappear, but their logic and their meaning become absorbed in the 
network” (p. 442).  Much like the railway systems impacted the industrial age, 
communication technologies redefine places in the information age. Old economy hubs 
may be marginalized and new hubs emerge as the new network redistributes flows of 
resources.  
In this process, network logics emerge as a new factor in determining the 
distributions of flows of material, information, and social relationships. These network 
logics, as revealed by computer scientists and topologists, include the power law 
distribution, the growth rule and the preferential attachment, concepts which will be 
defined shortly. In short, the Internet is a hierarchy of connections. The better connected 
one node is, the more privileged it is. Time and each node’s preferential linking 
determine the distribution of connections; however, technologies are not the only 
determining power. As Castells noted, “interactive computer networks are growing 
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exponentially, creating new forms and channels of communication, shaping life and 
being shaped by life at the same time” (2000, p. 1). 
The cyber news space is the globally connected networks of online news 
production. As stated above, the Internet is integrating every aspect of news production 
and connecting all news organizations into one global network. As the Internet becomes 
the medium of our time, news production also falls subject to the network logics. 
Conversely, real life factors such as geography, the ecology of news production, and the 
political environment contribute to shaping the networks of online news production.  
China’s cyber news space 
This study offers a network analysis of China’s cyber news space. Juxtaposing 
cyber space with a nation may seem ironic since conceptually cyber space is supposed to 
be borderless. However, empirical studies find that not only are there gates, gaps, and 
distance in the cyber space, there also exist national borders (Qiu, 2000). Zook (2001) has 
done an analysis of all countries’ online content production. He found that while some 
countries are content as Internet importers and exporters, China is an Internet island, 
where the production of content is self-contained. While maintaining a high volume of 
online content production, China does not often exchange information with the outside 
world. Actually, the Chinese government’s installation of a so-called great firewall to 
filter flows of online content into and out of the country is well known. As China 
emerges as an important player on the global stage, the question arises whether the 
Internet is changing China or if China is changing the Internet. Therefore, it is important 
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to analyze what’s happening within the borders of China. Note that China in this context 
strictly refers to the Mainland, excluding Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. PF1 
China is intriguing. It runs a highly controlled media system, ranked by The 
Freedom House as No. 177 of 194 countries in the annual ranking of the freedom of 
media systems in 2005. The press in China is regarded as “not free”. In sharp contrast, 
the media market in China is among the world’s most prosperous (Tunstall, 2007). The 
Internet has become a mainstream medium in China and boasts the world’s largest 
population of Internet users (CIA, 2008). Chinese Internet users regard online news 
reading as their second most important use of the Internet (CNNIC, 2010). Four Chinese 
websites have made the list of the world’s top 20 websites by traffic (Alexa, 2010) and 
yet the Chinese government’s control over the Internet is regarded as the most 
sophisticated in the world (Goldsmith & Wu, 2006). The so-called Great Fire Wall works 
as China’s national border in the cyberspace. The Great Fire Wall filters and regulates 
flows of information into China.  
Ordinary Chinese Internet users simply do not have access to many popular 
Western Websites such as  Facebook, Myspace, Twitter, Blogger, Flickr, Picasa, Youtube, 
                                                 
P
1
P Hong Kong and Macau are under self-elected regional governments and have 
very different political and media systems than the mainland. Taiwan’s history is equally 
complex. This island has been separated from the mainland since the Nationalists Party 
lost to the Communist Party in China’s civil war and retreated to Taiwan in 1949. Taiwan 
identifies itself as the Republic of China, as opposed to the People’s Republic of China 
under the Communists. China claims sovereignty over Taiwan. All nations that have 
formal diplomatic relationships with China, as well as the UN, officially endorse that 
claim. Yet Taiwan has been self-governing since 1949 and the Communist Party of China 
has never set a foot on this island. Despite all the complexity, people on both sides of the 
Taiwan Strait share the same language, ethnicity (to the majority of the population), 
culture, believe system and ancestors. Nowadays, economic corporations and cultural 
exchanges across the strait are frequent and widespread. News from and about Taiwan 
are also common in Mainland media. 
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Wikipedia, and most recently, Google (Branigan, 2009; Greatfirewallofchina.org, 2010). 
This lends to the appearance that whenever truly innovative Websites rise in the West, 
China’s reaction is to block the original site and launch its own copycats as substitutes. 
By evolving in this manner, China somehow still keeps current with the latest technology 
but maintains government control over potentially threatening elements from the Internet. 
Although social media and blogs continue to grow quickly in China, they also remain 
subject to close government control. Most of the information flows in these newer 
channels are entertainment and utilitarian in nature. It is unclear how much impact they 
would have on the distribution of news (Colaizzi, 2010). Therefore, this study will leave 
these new channels of news diffusion to future study and focus on only portals and 
traditional news organizations.  
As the news production moves online, what is the order of China’s cyber news 
space? Has the network logic reshaped the distribution of media power? What news 
organizations have gained centrality and what organizations are marginalized? How are 
different geographic locations represented in the cyber news space? How are foreign 
countries connected to China’s cyber news space? This study tries to seek answers to 
these questions by a content analysis of the news sections of China’s top four commercial 
portals.  
The second chapter provides a brief introduction to Castells’ concept of the space 
of flows, network logics, and gatekeeping theory. Network logics include the power law 
and the principle of preferential attachment. Gatekeeping theory provides an explanation 
of online news organizations’ actions of preferential attachment. This chapter also covers 
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the study of the geographic distribution of the Internet. This chapter tries to show how 
geography affects flows of information in the cyber news space. 
The third chapter offers an introduction to China’s media reforms, the salient 
elements in China’s media system and the development of online media in China.  
The fourth chapter contains research questions and hypotheses; the fifth chapter 
describes the methods employed; the sixth chapter presents results and the last chapter 






































The network of online news production and the control over flows of online news  
The term “network analysis” may currently be one of the hottest buzz words 
among academic researchers, thanks to the Internet. It is widely applied in various 
disciplines, ranging from computer science, physics, and disease control to economics, 
sociology and communication. This term applies to the study of such diverse subjects as 
the physical structure of the Internet, power grids, the transmission of the AIDS  virus, 
large corporations, international financial systems, drug trafficking, e-commerce and 
online social networking (Barabasi, 2002).  
Despite the massive differences among these networks, they all consist of two 
fundamental elements, according to topologists like Barabasi (2002) Watts (2003), and 
Huberman (2001) : nodes and links.  Nodes are the basic building units of a network. 
Links are connections between the nodes. Any network starts from one or a bunch of 
nodes which, once connected, form a network. Some networks are planned centrally and 
then constructed, while the others simply take root and grow without any central control.  
Some networks are egalitarian, meaning that all nodes in these networks are born equal. 
These nodes are essentially the same in terms of their positions in a network, the number 
of links and the other resources that they occupy. Most networks are non-egalitarian. In 
these networks, some nodes are superior to others. They can take a more central position, 
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occupy more resources, or both. According to Barabasi (2002), the most critical resource 
in a network is links. A non-egalitarian network is essentially a hierarchy of links. The 
more links a node has, the better connected it is to the rest of the network and the more 
central its position. The best connected nodes in a network are called hubs. Hubs are vital 
to the success of a network because of their special role in transmitting the flows of 
resources (either material or informational) on a network.  
The studies of a network always come with analyses of flows on this network. 
Without the flows, a network is just a lifeless structure. Just imagine a highway system 
without any traffic, a power grid without any electric current, and a communication 
network without any signal. We study the network because we want to know how a 
particular network will carry flows, and how the structure and flows will affect the nodes 
and the environment of the network. Flows on an egalitarian network often move 
inefficiently. Imagine 10 nodes arranged in a circle. Each node has only two neighboring 
nodes, and only links to these two neighbors.  Label these nodes in the sequence of A, B, 
C... J.  Suppose node A wants to send a message to node F, which located on the opposite 
side of the circle. This message has to start from node A, then pass node B, C, D, and E 
(or on the other direction, node J, I ,H, and G), and finally reach node F, which involves 
five links. Then suppose we make node C a hub of this network, adding links to it so that 
it holds a direct connection to every other node. In this new non-egalitarian network, flow 
now moves much faster. A message from A to F can now take the route of A-C-F, 
involving only two links. This illustrates the importance of a hub: it essentially provides 
shortcuts for flows.  
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The entire industry of news production is a giant network. There are two kinds of 
nodes in the network of news production: individual and organizational. The individual 
nodes are news reporters who gather stories, editors who select stories for publishing, and 
those involved in the transition of news flows.  The organizational nodes are news outlets 
such as news papers, TV stations, news websites, wire services (i.e. the Associated Press), 
and all other organizations involved in the transition of news flows. There are various 
kinds of links between these nodes, such as employment of reporters and editors, 
organizational relationship between reporters and editors, cooperation between news 
organizations, etc. This network of news production is crucial to the flows of news in the 
modern society.  
Perhaps the best model of flows of news in the modern society is Everett Rogers’ 
model of news production. When a news story breaks, how does it penetrate and 
permeate society? If you take the entire human society as a giant network, how many 
nodes can a piece of news finally reach? If the success of news production is measured by 
the number of nodes this news finally reaches, then how to make the diffusion of a 
particular piece of news more successful? According to Rogers(1995), the rate at which a 
piece of news diffuses in a society conforms to the S-shaped curve of innovation. When a 
news story first breaks, the diffusion rate is low because there usually only exist a small 
number of witnesses with limited social connections, who can only transfer the flow of 
this news to a slightly larger social circle. However, if this piece of news reaches some 
well-connected nodes, such as the opinion leaders of certain communities or even mass 
media, the diffusion speed would raise sharply. These opinion leaders and mass media 
are hubs of the network of news communication. Because they can reach a crowd easily, 
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the news flows now have a shortcut to a large number of nodes quickly. This S-shaped 
diffusion curve starts to level off after half of the nodes in a network have already 
received this news, because those without knowledge become increasingly scarce. 
Therefore, the critical point that determines successful dissemination of a news story 
stems from whether it will quickly reach major hubs; that is, powerful mass media. 
Facing hundreds (if not thousands) of news items everyday, which do the news producers 
decide to publish? This is where the theory of news production joins the theory of 
gatekeeping.  
Gatekeeping, according to Rogers (1995, p. 148), “is controlling the flow of 
messages through a communication channel.” When news initiated in all different nodes 
compete for the access of critical hubs, these hubs play the role of gate-keepers which 
control the flow of news in the network of news production. Traditional gate-keeping 
studies focused on influences from individuals such as news editors. They argued that the 
so-called Mr. Gates makes the decisions about what news goes in and what news stays 
out.  In Mediating the Message: Theories of Influences on Mass Media Content, Pamela 
Shoemaker and Stephen Reese argued (1996) that routinized judgment lies behind Mr. 
Gates’ decision.  The personal bias of Mr. Gates may affect his decision of news 
selection but this personal influence is only minimal. Mr. Gates must constantly ensure 
that his news selection remains consistent with his news organizations’ polices. Therefore, 
flows in the network of production are controlled by gate-keeping practices of mass 
media. The widely distributed stories conform to the routines and polices of news 
organizations.  
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It is undeniable that the Internet has become a main stream mass media. How will 
the Internet change or reshape the network of news production? First of all, the Internet 
greatly accelerated the flows of news. Via the Internet, news travels at the speed of light 
all over the globe. Secondly, it greatly enlarged the pool of news from which news 
organizations select stories for publishing. Now the online news editors from elite news 
organizations can promptly learn of a story as it transpires in a remote geographic spot 
which traditional news reporters do not cover. Additionally, the Internet greatly enlarged 
the reach of an online news publisher. Instead of a newspaper’s typically local audience, 
a news website instead can reach a global audience, at least in theory. The Internet also 
boosts competition among news outlets. No longer protected by geographic boundaries, 
local media must compete face to face with powerful national media. The Internet makes 
it much easier for new producers to stay abreast of their competitors, and to glean news 
items and ideas from them. This certainly facilitates inter-media news flows. Finally, the 
Internet also breaks down the wall between news producers and their audiences. Stories 
reported first by bloggers occasionally make headlines of powerful traditional media. 
However, since this study focuses only on the news flows among the formal news 
producers, the topic of bloggers and other audience contributions will be left for future 
research.  
The paths through which news traverses different “gates” of online news outlets 
make up a network of online news production. The nodes of this network of online news 
production are news websites. The links between these websites are editor’s practices of 
passing on one story originating from other websites. In the network of online news 
production, which websites will have the most connections? Which ones will be the hubs 
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that yield the most influence upon the flows of news? Where are the gates that lead to the 
successful diffusion of a piece of news? Daniel Sgroi (2008) analyzed the current 
structure of the Web and found that the Web is evolving into a central star network. The 
star nodes have significantly more links than others. Their existence increases the cost 
efficiency and stability of the entire network. The more links a node has, the more central 
its position on the network, the more power it has over the flows, and the more profit it 
makes.  As star nodes strive for more links, it is possible that one day the Web will be 
dominated by a single intermediate site. Sgroi predicted this site to be a search engine. In 
the network of online news production, it is not likely that a search engine will dominate, 
at least in the near future. The more plausible candidate may be a portal site. Portal sites 
like Yahoo! have long been prominent online news outlets. In China’s network of online 
news production, portals are the biggest hubs.  
It is a common practice among China’s news websites to borrow stories from 
each other. The websites of traditional news organizations not only publish their self-
produced stories, but also they republish stories taken from other websites. If a website 
uses a story from another news organization, it usually puts a hyperlink to the original 
publisher just under the headline of the story. Thus, the action of mutual citation connects 
different sites. Flows of stories traverse from site to site in cyber space. Again, these 
portal sites are the biggest hubs. They have connections with most sites and the largest 
audience. They take in the largest amount of flows and transmit these stories to the public 
most efficiently. Which stories the portals choose to publish and which websites they 
choose to cite greatly affect the flows of news on China’s online news network. 
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Network logics  
Topologists like Barabasi (2002), Watts (2003), and Huberman (2001) argue that 
some universal logics govern all networks. They use the Internet and the Web as the 
testing fields of the network logic. The network logics they propose are the power law of 
distribution, the growth rule, and the rule of preferential attachment.  
The Internet, according to Severin and Tankard, is “a world wide network of 
computer networks” (2001, p. 366). One key feature of the Internet is its center-less 
structure. Rather than stemming from central planning and control, the Internet simply 
emerged and evolved. Anyone with some basic equipment such as a PC and a connection 
can easily connect to the Internet and publish online. The Internet has been seen, 
therefore, as a potential site for the fulfillment of true, absolute democracy. However, as 
its later evolution shows, although the Internet does not have a center, it is not an 
egalitarian network at all. There are various hubs that are critical to flows of online 
information. Hubs are incredibly different from each other in terms of size and power. 
The Internet is actually a hierarchy of links. The more links a node has, the higher its 
position on the hierarchy and the more powerful its presence on the Internet. The 
topologists who studied the Web propose that one way to investigate the Internet as a 
system the approximation of the distribution of the number of links per node 
(Krishnamurthy, 2004). A study by Barabasi (2002) found that eighty percent of links on 
the Web point to only fifteen percent of all Webpages. The more links a node has, the 
more traffic it will attract, and the more visible and influential it will be in cyber space.  
The richness of hubs can be characterized by the power law of distribution.  When 
first approaching the Internet as a system and studying the distribution of the number of 
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links per node, researchers assumed the distribution would be normal, meaning that very 
few nodes would have lots of links and very few nodes would have a small number of 
links as well.   Instead, researchers hypothesized that the majority of the nodes would 
have an intermediate number of links, and these intermediate numbers should be around 
the average number of links of all nodes. However, empirical studies  (Barabasi & Albert, 
1999; Huberman, 2001) found that on the Internet the distribution of links per node is far 
from normal and instead follows the power law. The general formula of the power law 
distribution is: 1( )N k k β: , ( 0, 1)k β> ≥ ,  where parameterβ  is the degree exponent.  
When k increases, the value of ( )N k  decreases rapidly. Therefore, the graph of power 
law distribution is a dramatically decreasing curve (figure 1). The lager theβ , the closer 
the curve is to the Y axis, and larger the decreasing rate of ( )N k  compared to the 
increasing rate of k  (adapted from Huberman (2001)). A rough graph of the power law is 
shown below:  













As shown in Figure 1, while the majority of the nodes have a very limited number 
of links, a small number of nodes can have numerous links. The distribution of links per 
node remains so skewed that the arithmetic mean can no longer represent a typical node 
in terms of the number of links attached to it. In fact, the majority of nodes have far less 
links than the arithmetic mean. The typical number of links that a Webpage contains 
should be the mode, a statistic that refers to the number of links on the most frequently 
encountered nodes. Another interesting property of the power law is that it is scale-free. 
If a system obeys the power law, then no matter what the length scales are, the 
distribution of the variable of interest remains the same. If one can determine the 
distribution of links per page, they can predict what the distribution will be for another 
range of studies. Empirical studies have shown that the power-law nature of the Internet 
is extremely robust. Huberman and colleagues have uncovered a power-law distribution 
for the number of visits to a site (Adamic and Huberman 2000), the number of pages 
within a site (Huberman and Adamic 1999), and the number of links to a page (Albert, 
Jeoung, and Barabasi 1999).  
Other than the power law, there are similar ways to describe the concentration of 
links: the Pareto’s law and the rule of heavy tail. In the 19Pth P century, Italian economist 
Pareto found that about 20 percent of all families in Italy owned about 80 percent of all 
land. Also labeled as the 20/80’s rule, the Pareto’s law often describes the concentration 
of social resources within a minority of members in a society. The rule of heavy tail is a 
more graphic description of the same phenomenon. Just like in Figure 1, the curve shows 
a heavy tail. If one plots the wealth a family possesses against the number of families in 
the United States, he will certainly get a heavy tail. Similarly, plotting an English word’s 
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frequency of use against the total number of words in English also results in a heavy tail 
graph.  
Why does the distribution of links on the Internet obey the power law of 
distribution?  If individual actions are random, then why do links concentrate as a result 
of countless random actions? If we define these well-connected nodes in a network as 
hubs (Tremayne, 2005), then how does a node become a hub? Barabasi and Albert 
propose a “rich get richer” model. Two principles comprise the model: the growth rule 
and the rule of preferential attachment. The growth rule basically involves time. Suppose 
the networks are assembled one node at a time. In a network, the older a node is, the 
higher the probability that this node will be linked. If growth is the only rule, then 
websites established in the early 1990’s should have a great number of links, while those 
established more recently should have less links. This is not the case because of the 
second rule, the rule of preferential attachment, which assumes that the probability that a 
new node’s choice of an existing node depends on the number of links attached to it. In 
other words, when a network adds a new node, it most likely links to the ones that are 
already heavily linked. Over time, the rich get richer. As a result of the combined effects 
of the growth rule and the rule of preferential attachment, the distribution of the number 
of links per node inevitably follows the power law.  
However, as Tremayne points out (2003), the power law of distribution is ideal. 
As Figure 1 shows, the tail of a power law of distribution is infinite.  In reality, the tail 
has to be finite. The power law assumes only a negligible cost to add new links. As the 
cost of adding new links rises, the growth rate of the hubs, or heavily linked nodes, 
decreases. At the point when the cost is considered too high, the growth of hubs is stunted.  
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The principle of preferential attachment relates to the quality of each node. In the 
abstract world of topological research, this quality is simply the number of links. The 
more links a node possesses, the higher its linkable quality. In the real world, besides how 
heavily it is already linked, a node has many other qualities that may influence its 
linkability. When applying the topologists’ principles to the real world situation, factor in 
these “other qualities,” which depend on the context of each network under study.  
In the context of online news production network, portal news editors’ 
gatekeeping decisions reflect the principle of preferential attachment. Facing a huge pool 
of online news everyday, the news editors must select carefully. Once they choose a story 
from certain site, they establish a link between the portal and the original site. This link is 
a preferential attachment based on the editors’ judgment of what is consistent with their 
portal’s routines, policies and best interest.  
Empirical studies on the network of online news 
The principles of preferential attachment provide the possibility of factoring in 
real life conditions into the abstract model of the topologists. Tremayne (2003) found that 
contextual potential of news items fit that condition. Applying the network logics to study 
linking pattern of online news, he found that international stories tend to contain more 
hyperlinks than average stories while spot news tends to contain fewer hyperlinks than 
average stories. International stories provide many possibilities for contextual 
information such as geography, history, and politics about certain countries or regions. 
By contrast, spot news’s concern focuses on the straight facts and limited contextual 
possibilities. Therefore, in the network of interlinked news Webpages, contextual 
potential of each news item is a factor of preferential attachment.  
 19
In his latter studies, T remayne found a series of factors of preferential attachment 
in different scenarios, thus provided eviden ce of how life shapes  the  net throug h the 
mechanism of preferential attachm ent. To  study the war blogosphere, Trem ayne and 
students (Tremayne, Zheng, Lee, & Jeong, 200 6 ) used a multiple reg ression model to 
look for predictors of the number of incom ing links that  each blog receives. The 
regression model includes f actors like authorship, p olitics, pos t type, af fect, 
responsiveness, gender, outgoi ng links, and blogger background. The results show  that 
the number of outgoing links and original repo rting are two factors that affect how many 
links that each blog  attracts. Another analysis of the political blogosphere (Harp & 
Tremayne, 2006) shows that the gender of th e blogger m ay also influence each blog’s 
attractiveness to incoming links.  
Two years after his original  study on the linking pattern  of Web news, Trem ayne 
(2005) documented another trend: online news ed itors prefer in-site archives to resources 
from extern al webs ites when they a dd link s to  contextu al infor mation for their s tories. 
Analyses of a five-year data set rev ealed that the use of external links d ecreased, just as 
the total numbers of all link s increased, over time. Because it tak es only a click to move 
from one news organization to another in the online environment, news editors try to use 
in-site linking to retain traffic. Technology pr ovided the possibility of an open, free-flow 
space for n ews. But th e com petition between  news orga nizations m akes them  “gated  
cyber com munities”. This study  also revea led som e other linking  pref erences: the 
proportion of external links wa s particularly low for fina ncial news and international 
relation stories; m ilitary and governm ent websites were  the m ost commonly linked 
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external sites; and there was no differen ce between national newspaper websites and 
national broadcast websites in terms of the use of external links. 
Works by Trem ayne are ground breaking in  introducing the network logics to 
analyze the linking pa tterns of news Webpages and blogs . He found several factors that 
may affect e ach node’s (be it W ebpage, blog or  website) decision of preferential linking 
in a given network. However, he did not exam ine these factors in a systematic way. The 
theory of gatekeeping provides an excel lent standpoint to understand the linking 
preferences of each node, especially for the nodes in a network of news production.  
Gatekeeping: the control of online news flows 
A brief review of the gatekeeping theory 
Gatekeeping is defined as “the process by which the billions of messages that are 
available in the world get cut down and transformed into the hundreds of messages that 
reach a given person on a given day” (Shoemaker, 1991, p. 1).  For the past six decades, 
communication scholars used the concept of gatekeeping to explain the “differential 
flows of messages throughout time and space” (p. 3). Mass media’s selection and 
representation of news items are most frequently studied. Everyday, a news organization 
and its representatives make numerous decisions on what items to include from a large 
pool of messages, how to turn these messages into news and transmit them to the 
audience. A ‘gate’ is a point where the decisions of ‘in’ or ‘out’ are made.  
Since the first pairing of gatekeeping and communication in the 1940s, 
gatekeeping has become an important area of communication research. Accumulated 
studies on gatekeeping have explored different aspects of this phenomenon. Before a 
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message reaches a gate, what characteristics does it have? Which channel does it come 
from? What are the forces in front of and behind the gate? 
Gatekeeping takes place at different levels. Different levels of analysis lead to 
different questions. The tradition of gatekeeping study started at the individual level of 
analysis. At the individual level, factors that may affect the results of gatekeeping include: 
an individual gatekeepers’ “personality, background, values, role conceptions, and 
experiences” (Shoemaker, 1991, p. 34). For example, White’s study (1950) of Mr. Gates 
looked only at individuals’ decisions of including and excluding news items. He 
concludes that individual gatekeepers’ “own set of experiences, attitudes, and 
expectations” (p. 386) form the basis of their professional judgments. News production is 
an inherently unmanageable task. Routines, “patterned, routinized, repeated practices for 
forms that media workers use to do their job” (Shoemaker, 1991, p. 48), provide crucial 
guidelines to individual gatekeepers in determining the flow of information in a 
communication channel. At the organizational level, gatekeeping analyses focus on issues 
such as filtering systems, organizational characteristics, organizational boundary roles, 
and organizational socialization. An organization’s structure, culture, strategy, and rules 
all affect gatekeeping at this level. The extramedia, social/institutional level of analysis 
concerns factors like source, audience, advertiser, market, government and interest 
groups.  
Gatekeeping has important social consequences. The most obvious effects that 
gatekeeping has on audience is shaping the so-called ‘cognitive map’. Information that 
passes through the ‘gate’ comprises what we learn from media as social reality but not 
information that stops at the ‘gate’. Besides, gatekeeping also seems to have the potential 
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to affect opinions and attitudes. Mass media yield the most influence on shaping people’s 
cognitive map when they present a consonant version of social reality. In that situation, 
the audience doesn’t have much information from which to form alternative views.  
Gatekeeping in the network of online news production 
The theory of gatekeeping has the potential to explain the formation and structure 
of the network of news production beyond basic network logics. It adds context to the 
abstract topological rules. According to Barabasi (2002) and Tremayne (2003; 2005), the 
entire Internet and the network of interlinked news Webpages are governed by the 
principle of preferential attachment. In the context of online news production, what 
makes some online news organizations more preferable than others? By analyzing 
gatekeeping at the organization level, this study may reveal the factors that influence the 
nodes’ linking decisions in the cyber news space. This study focuses only on gatekeeping 
at the organizational level because news organizations are basic nodes of the network of 
news production. Through the gatekeeping actions of each news organization, the 
network is formed.   
An organization is “a bounded, adaptive, open system that exists in an 
environment, interacts with elements of it, and engages in the transformation of inputs 
into outputs having effects on its environment and feedback effects on itself” (Adams, 
1980, p.322). Gatekeeping, from the organizational point of view, amounts to a series of 
transactions between the organization and those external to it. Inputs include the 
population of messages that come to the attention of the communication organization, 
and outputs comprise those that are selected and transmitted. Gatekeeping, therefore, 
involves two processes. First there is the selection and rejection of input messages, by 
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one called a “boundary role person,” according to criteria established by the organization. 
Second is the determination of what the outputs should be, which involves a boundary 
role person selecting and rejecting from among the input messages according to the 
criteria of those external to the organization. Therefore, the organization’s own criteria 
should determine the selection of stories for processing and consideration, whereas 
criteria established by the organization’s media clients should determine the stories for 
later transmission to the clients. 
Previous analyses revealed that the Internet is not an egalitarian network. All 
nodes are not created equal. In the words of Zook (2001), the Internet is a new hierarchy 
of centrality. The better connected a node in a network, the higher its position in this 
hierarchy of centrality, and the more influence it yields. Hubs are critical to the success of 
the diffusion of any piece of news. Consequently, the gatekeeping practices of hubs 
should have more important social consequences than ordinary nodes. By controlling the 
flows of news, hubs determine which news items we are more likely to be exposed to, 
and therefore shape our cognitive map of the world. When the Internet first emerged as 
mass media, its acclaim centered around bringing diversity to news production (Gillmor, 
2004). The Internet breaks down the barriers of news production and gives the voiceless a 
channel of being heard. However, if the hubs become too dominant on the network of 
news production, then it remains possible that online media provide a consonant version 
of social reality. More recent studies found that online media tend to present a 
homogeneous agenda (Yu, 2005). Hirsch (1981) pointed out that mass media act as 
cultural gatekeepers for the larger society. It is important to figure out the location of the 
hubs and what they offer on the network of news production.  
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Geographic distribution of links 
Geography long has been an important factor of news production. Reporters travel 
to different places looking for stories and to send back to their editors. Once they select 
day’s news, news organizations distribute it to their audience through air, cable or paper. 
Traditionally, most media mainly serve one local market, which is defined by geographic 
boundaries. Only the few elite media are able to cover a national audience. Before the 
Internet emerged as a mainstream medium, both story collection and content distribution 
were costly. The further a report or a distribution went, the more costly the production. 
While geography used to be a tight constraint on news production, the Internet has 
changed the picture. The cost of online communication is almost negligible. Anyone with 
the access to the Internet has access to the world’s online news, no matter where this 
news is produced or by whom. Any message put online has the potential to reach an 
audience all round the world. Geographic distances now seem only a click away. The 
eclipse of geography on the Internet challenges traditional news production. News 
producers wonder who their audience is; advertisers figure new way to reach their market; 
and governments worry about regulation in this new, wild terrain. 
In the early stages of the Internet, some prophesied (Friedman, 2005) the death of 
distance. Contrary to this early vision, however, empirical studies found that geography 
continues to play an important role in online communications. Internet traffic appears to 
decline with distance and is increasingly concentrated within localities, countries, and 
regions. For example, Murnion and Healey (1998) found that Web interaction declines 
with distance. Thelwall (2002) found a similar trend when he analyzed the hyperlink 
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connections between academic Websites compared to the physical distance between them. 
After all, content providers, data consumers, and Internet hardwires all have their real-
space geographic distribution, which is crucial to the efficacy of online communication 
(Goldsmith & Wu, 2006).  Rather than simply rendering geography irrelevant, the 
Internet is redefining space “ very much like railways defined ‘economic regions’ and 
‘national markets’ in the industrial economy” (Castells, 2000, p. 443).  
From the perspective of geography, two potential trends characterize how the 
Internet is reshaping the network of news production. One is concentration. On the 
Internet, news media are no longer confined to a certain geographic locality. Media from 
all different locations now compete in the same cyberspace.  On one hand, this change 
may give media from more remote geographical places a channel to reach much wider 
audiences. However, smaller local media may lose the protection from geographic 
boundaries against powerful media from more traditionally central places, such as big 
cities.  As a result, the network of online news production tends to concentrate on urban 
nodes.  
The other major trend is alienation. The network of online news production is 
becoming more point-oriented. The other side of the concentration of news flow in big 
cities is the possible alienation of relative hinterlands of these urban nodes. As news 
produced in hub locations is being better diffused in the network of online news 
production, news from the surrounding area of the hubs may have a slimmer chance to 
pass the selection gate of online news editors.  A case from the software industry may 
provide an analogy. As the information technology industry makes Bangalore a global 
hub of software production, India’s vast inland working class remains left largely 
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unconnected (Castells, 2000).  The same could happen to the network of online news 
production; while the Internet diffuses the news produced in big cities about global 
leaders and world-class celebrities, common folks living in the majority of communities 
may find themselves more and more invisible in the landscape of online news.  
Studies of the geography of Internet content creation and distribution revealed the 
trend of concentration of online content production in the developed world (Zook, Dodge, 
Aoyama, & Townsend, 2004). Zook (2001) mapped the global distribution both of 
domain names and users. Internet enables people to go beyond their own geographic 
confinements for information. If the production of content tends to concentrate on a few 
nodes, it is likely that people from peripheral areas of the network of content production 
ingest information produced far away from home. Some urban nodes may gain centrality 
as production centers while the majority of locales become net importers of online 
content. How to capture the dynamic of the production and consumption of online 
content? Where are the production centers and where are the content markets? Zook 
tackled these questions by analyzing the distribution of domain names in different 
countries. There were two kinds of top level domain names (TLD): 1) country code (CC) 
domains such as .cn for China and .jp for Japan; and 2) CONE (.com, .org, .net, and .edu), 
which are designed for businesses, nonprofit organizations, computer networks, and 
educational institutions. Zook reasoned that CC domains are more geared toward a 
domestic audience, while CONE domains are more global-oriented. If a country has large 
ratio of CC to CONE domains, its global presence is not very strong, despite the fact that 
all web pages should be accessible world wide. To compare the number of domains and 
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users across countries, Zook developed a measure called Internet Consumption Quotient 
(ICQ) to standardize the data. The formula for this measure is:  
 
 
Zook calculated two kinds of ICQs: the domestic ICQ and the global ICQ. The 
domestic ICQ involves just the country code domains (CC), while the global ICQ 
involves both global top level domains (CONE) and the country code domains (CC). “An 
ICQ value of greater than 1.0 indicates either strong domestic or global presence” (p. 21). 
Using these two ICQs, Zook constructed a 2 by 2 matrix in which countries are placed by 
their strength of both domestic and/or global presence. The result is a matrix with four 
cells: export enclaves, global traders, content consumers, and Internet islands. The matrix 
is shown below in figure 2 (slightly modified):  
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By using this typology, Zook found that by the end of 1999, the United States was 
the absolute center of the Internet, containing more than half of all domain names in the 
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world. With strong content production and consumption, it fits in the category of Global 
Traders. This category includes mostly North American and Western European countries. 
The next category, the content consumers group, contains countries from Eastern Europe 
and the developing world. The third category, export enclaves, includes Saudi Arabia, 
Thailand and Costa Rica. Countries have clear needs to provide information to people 
outside the country. And the last category, Internet Islands, is comprised of countries with 
high domestic ICQ but low global ICQ, which means that its online content production is 
mostly geared toward a domestic audience. China and Russia are such examples.  
 This study also found that domain names aggregated in big cities, regardless of 
country variations. The world’s top 100 cities (by population) contain over half of the 
world’s Internet domain names, although they only account for 6.7 percent of the world’s 
population. Almost all the world’s top 25 cities in terms of total domain names are in the 
United States, with the only exception of London (4PthP) and Toronto (24PthP). The heart of 
Internet content production remains in Silicon Valley, San Francisco, San Jose and 
Oakland contain 43.0, 32.1, and 19.1 domains per 1,000 people.  
In another study of the distribution of e-commerce across America, Zook (2002) 
found that e-commerce provides the impetus and means to reorganize the economic and 
geographic space in which businesses operate. Although not every place will become an 
e-commerce hub, all regions will be shaped by the way in which firms adapt to this new 
commercial medium. He found that in terms of e-commerce development, the southern 
and Midwest regions appear to be lagging behind their counterparts in other parts of the 
country.  
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Brunn and Dodge (2001) analyzed the global Internet connections between 
nations/regions using data on the number of Webpages and hyperlinks gathered from a 
commercial search engine in 1998. In their analysis, publishing Webpages are regarded 
as production and the exchange of hyperlinks between nations/regions is regarded as 
trade. They found that the global linking network largely replicated the global trade 
system. In general, the global economic powers also are the leaders of Webpage 
publishing and hyperlink connection. The researchers sampled 174 countries and divided 
them into a four-level, world-linking system: core, semi periphery, near periphery, and 
distant periphery. Most of the European countries, Canada and the US, and most 
countries from East Asia are located in the core, while countries from Sub-Saharan Africa, 
the Middle East, and Central America and the Caribbean mostly are located outside the 
core. The authors developed a hyperlink index, patterned after the export-import index 
used by economic geographers and economists, to measure the balance in international 
hyperlink traffic: HI=OL/IL*1000. A high HI means a country has many more outgoing 
links (OL) than incoming links (IL), and a low HI means balance between OL and IL. 
Their findings show that, again, richer countries tend to have low HI value, indicating 
more a balanced linking status. Besides economic factors, distance and cultural ties also 
matter, contributing to the emergence of regional centers. For example, the countries of 
central Asia, such as Azerbaijan, have a large portion of OLs that go to Russia and 
relatively fewer OLs go to the rest of the world. This finding shows a distinct pattern of 
interconnections related to income. 
According to the alienation hypothesis, the space of flows is a point-oriented 
network that connects urban nodes and marginalizes rural areas. The disparity between 
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the urban poles and their respective hinterlands is one of the biggest problems of the 
network society. “Territories surrounding these nodes play an increasingly subordinate 
function, sometimes becoming irrelevant or even dysfunctional” (Castells, 2000, p. 411). 
His theory remains consistent with other observations of the Internet. Researchers who 
study the geographic distribution of the Internet in different countries, such as Norway, 
South Korea, Israel, Palestine, Jordon, China, Japan and the U.S., have found a similar 
pattern.  Rather than the early prediction of uniform and utopian connectivity, the Internet 
around the world is concentrated on a small number of urban nodes (Zook, 2005). A 
number of indicators of Internet activity such as bandwidth (Townsend, 2001; Malecki, 
2002) or domain names (Zook, 2000; Kolko, 2000) are disproportionately located in 
urban centers. This geography is marked by significant variation between regions and 
reflects the history and – economic status of specific regions, in some ways conforming 
to existing hierarchies, e.g., New York, while in others suggesting new hubs, e.g., Austin, 
TX (Zook, 2005). In another study, Zook found that three regions, San Francisco, New 
York and Los Angeles, appear as leading centers for Internet content in the United States 
(Zook, 2000).These empirical findings argue strongly against notions of uniform 
deployment of the Internet and instead predict variable outcomes in different cities and 














China’s media system 
Media commercialization in China 
In a Chinese news organization, what are the most important values which 
influence the editor’s selection of news? Despite the complex and multi-faceted nature of 
the contemporary media system in China, researchers (Akhavan-Majid, 2004; Chan, 1993; 
Chan, 1994; Chan, 1995; Chan, Lee, & Pan, 2006; Huang, 2001; Huang, 1997; Lee, He, 
& Huang, 2007 ; Lee, Zhou, & Yu, 2006; Pan, 2000; Pan & Chan, 2003; Sun, Chang, & 
Yu, 2001; Xiao & Polumbaum, 2006; Yang, 2007; Yue, 2007; Zhang, 1993; Zhao, 1998 ) 
tend to agree that controls from the party-state and the liberating forces of the market are 
the two deciding factors there.  
China long has been criticized for strict state control over its media. Freedom 
House, an independent organization that publishes annual rankings of the freedom of 
media in different countries, ranked China the No. 177 out of 194 countries and rated the 
Chinese press as “not free” in 2005. Their report on China states that its “news media are 
tightly controlled by the Central Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist 
Party, especially concerning topic areas deemed by the party to be politically sensitive… 
(House, 2005). On the other hand, the media market in China has enjoyed more than two 
decades of prosperity (Lee et al., 2007 ). The coexistence of tight government control and 
a prosperous market may be the most intriguing part of the media system in 
contemporary China.  
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The conflict, struggle, coexistence, or even cooperation between this government 
control and the market forces characterized the dynamic of China’s media reform that 
started three decades ago, when Deng Xiaoping initiated the so-called “reform and open-
door policy” in 1978. It is necessary to briefly review the reforms that have shaped and 
continue to shape contemporary China. 
Deng Xiaoping, China’s paramount leader, launched the “reform and open-door 
policy” in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution (Akhavan-Majid, 2004). As suggested 
by its name, this policy consists of two major parts: first, the transformation of the 
economic system from centrally planned to one more market-based capitalist; second, the 
reopening of China to the outside world. Deng did not launch this policy as a carefully 
designed plan, but as an immediate action to save China and its communist regime from 
the possible demise due to the Cultural Revolution.  Deng was very pragmatic, as 
embodied by one of his famous quotes: “It doesn't matter if a cat is black or white, so 
long as it catches mice” (Quotesdaddy.com, 2009).T T Directed by this philosophy, the 
“reform and open-door policy” is an ongoing experiment filled with ad hoc adjustments, 
pragmatic experiments, and lively analytical discussion.  
The first phase of the reforms met immediate success. In the first half of the 1980s, 
China lifted millions of people out of poverty. In 1981, the poverty rate of the population 
was 53%, a statistic brought below 20% by 1985 (Ravallion & Chen, 2009).  The country 
legalized and encouraged private entrepreneurship and free-market activities, and in 
greatly improved general living standards. The Chinese people suddenly found 
themselves facing never before offered consumption choices. However, about a decade of 
fast growth also lead to corruption and an imbalance in development, which ultimately 
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lead to the 1989 student uprising. The students called for more free-market reforms and 
pro-democracy political reforms as well. The response from the government was the 
Tiananmen Square Massacre, a crack-down order believed to have come from Deng 
himself. What followed was two years of stagnant development and overall tightened 
political control that severely challenged China’s movement to a free-market economy 
and open society.  
Once again, Deng Xiaoping single-handedly changed the situation. Although he 
did not want any progressive change in China’s political system, he never wanted to see 
the failure of the economic reforms. He steered the country back to the track of reforms 
with his famous “southern tour.” In the spring of 1992, Deng quietly traveled to the 
southern city of Shenzhen, one of five Special Economic Zones (SEZ) designed as 
experimental fields of free-market economy and a symbol of success of Deng’s reforms, 
without even notifying any of the top Party and government officials. At Shenzhen, he 
made the historical pronouncement that the a market economy is not incompatible with 
socialism (Akhavan-Majid, 2004). He further called for bolder and faster strides toward 
developing a market economy. Interestingly, Deng held no official position at that time, 
but the entire Party and government apparatus quickly switched track to align with 
Deng’s visions. This movement silenced all doubts and criticisms towards adopting a 
free-market economy at once. In the following year, the Communist Party declared that 
achieving a “socialist market economy” was the object of China’s reforms. Even the 
Chinese Constitution was modified subsequently to accommodate this new objective. 
That was the beginning of the second surge of development in the reform era.  
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The third surge of development came as China joining the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), which symbolizes China’s full embrace of the global capitalist 
market. China had applied for a position in WTO for a total of thirteen years until it was 
finally accepted in 1999.  
Three decades of reforms transformed China from a poor communist country on 
the verge of collapse into an economic powerhouse. China’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) has increased tenfold since 1978. This dramatic gain has made China the second-
largest economy in the world, after the U.S., by the end of 2008, based on adjusted price 
differences (CIA, 2009).  Meanwhile, the door is wide open. On one hand, Western 
investments, merchandises, and pop culture flourish throughout China; on the other, 
traveling abroad has become a common occurrence among ordinary Chinese over the past 
30 years. Perhaps the most intriguing part of China is that despite the tremendous success 
of the market economy, the dramatic improvement of living standards of the Chinese 
people, and significantly expanded room for personal choices, political control in this 
country remains tight. At least in the foreseeable future, Western-style democracy is 
hardly a possibility (Lee, 2000).  
China used to have a strictly controlled media system copied from the Soviet 
Union. Although the country itself is still developing, the media system in China is quite 
evolved. From its start, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) recognized 
the power of media in propagating their political views to the Chinese people (Barnett, 
1978). Mao Zedong (Chairman Mao) stressed that the four tasks for the mass media were 
to “propagandize the policies of the Party, educate the masses, organize the masses, and 
mobilize the masses” (Hong, 1998). To fulfill these tasks, media should always act as the 
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Party’s “loyal eyes, ears, and tongue” (Chang, 1989, p.163). Since it took power in 1949, 
the CCP rapidly developed a media system based on the Soviet Union’s model, where the 
state owned and financially supported all media. The structure of the media system was 
highly centralized and hierarchical: each level of governmental administration (central, 
provincial, municipal, county, and township) had its own propaganda ministries and news 
media. At the top of this communication hierarchy sat the Propaganda Ministry of the 
Party’s Central Committee, which determined policies and issued operational directives. 
Commands from the top were delivered through the Party chain to various provincial, 
municipal, and local Party propaganda ministries. The propaganda ministry at different 
hierarchical levels oversaw and censored media at its respective level. Consequently, the 
official organs of the Party’s central committee, such as the People’s Daily, the China 
Central Television (CCTV), or the official Xinhua News Agency, were deemed as the 
most important. Whenever “necessary,” media at all levels had to re-print or re-broadcast 
the editorials or other important materials from these top party organs. All working units 
(schools, government bureaus, military units and factories, etc.) had to subscribe to party 
newspapers both from the top level and from their corresponding level. This system of 
ideological control was so powerful that it touched every social cell (Hong, 1998; Pan, 
2000).  
Since the late 1970s, reforms have swept every sector of social life in China. The 
media system was no exception. While the reforms largely changed the media system in 
China, we must recognize the intrinsic interconnectedness between politics and emerging 
markets in the course of media change. It is a process of an uneasy collusion between the 
 36
party-state authorities and media practitioners in preserving the Party-press system under 
a market economy (Pan, 2005).  
Most analyses of this reform tend to follow a “dissident vs. state” framework 
derived from “Western historical experience of moving from authoritarian to libertarian 
press systems” (Akhavan-Majid, 2004, p. 554). In this frame work, media reform in 
China is described as an ongoing “tug of war” between Chinese Communist party-state 
and the market forces.  As a result of this “war,” the party state is experiencing a certain 
level of “loss of control” over the media system because of the market forces.  
 First, the reforms always have had a highly confined institutional and ideological 
space. Second, both officials and media practitioners insist that the reforms consist of 
changing certain operating mechanisms and rules to better implement the principles and 
basic rules of the Party-press system. And the last, China’s media reforms are not a well-
planned and coherent project with a clearly specified destination. At every turn on the 
rocky path of reform, the highest political authorities reiterate the basic principles of the 
Party-press system while the establishment intellectuals, such as media scholars and elite 
journalists expand them (Pan, 2005). 
Chen (1998) described China’s media change as a three stage process.  The first 
stage, spanning 1949 to the end of 1970s, witnessed the establishment of the party-press 
system. Toward the end of the 1970s, as a result of the economic reform, markets of 
equipment, paper, energy and circulation services opened gradually in the second stage. 
This forced the state budget to cut off subsidies to the media and push them to find 
alternative financial resources. In the third stage, advertising industry became the primary 
financial source for media. The fourth stage saw the media conglomeration in the shadow 
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of the World Trade Organization. Policies permit the media conglomerates to attract 
capital investment from various sources, such as the stock market (Pan, 2005).   
The first significant media policy reform in China was the authorization given to 
media in 1979 to begin accepting advertising (Akhavan-Majid, 2004). Media reform in 
the last 30 years is a movement toward extreme commercialization.  There are three 
macro measures of media commercialization by the end of the 1990s: the gradual 
withdraw and final termination of state subsidies to almost all media organizations; the 
resurgence of the advertising industry; and media conglomeration (Lee et al., 2006; Pan, 
2000).  
Before the reforms, all media were mouth pieces of the Party, fully owned and 
subsidized by the party-state (Hong, 1998).  In the early 1980s, budgetary constraints 
forced the party-state to cut off media subsidies, although the party-state still claimed 
ownership of all media.  Not all media are born equal in terms of subsides reduction. The 
lower a media positioned in the hierarchy of the old media system, the more likely it 
would be one of the first ones to have its subsidies cut. For example, organs of the 
provincial level government had a better chance to keep their money from the party-state 
than organs of municipal level government. Key organs of the Party’s central committee, 
such as CCTV, Xinhua News Agency, and the People’s Daily, were continuously 
subsidized well into the 21Pst P century. However, even for these key organs, state subsides 
are not sufficient for them to operate.  
The reduction of subsides pushed media to strive for financial autonomy. The 
alternative revenue source that they found, not surprisingly, was advertisement. This 
turned out to be a bountiful resource. By the end of the 1990s, the majority of media 
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outlets had become not only financially self-sufficient but also profitable (Paek & Pan, 
2004). The key organs are no exception in their embrace of advertising income. In the 
book Reports on China’s TV Audience, the deputy director of CCTV, Yang Weigang, 
emphasizes that even this state organ needs to worry about program ratings and audience 
studies to “attract more advertisement” (Yang, 1998, p. 1). 
The resurgence of the advertising industry in China involves a story of a difficult 
start and phenomenal growth. In early 1977, two Shanghai newspapers published the first 
advertisement of the reform era after acquiring the municipal authority’s acquiescence 
(Huang, 1997). It was a politically risky action because media were regarded only as the 
mouthpiece of the Party. They were not supposed to profit themselves. Only three months 
later, the party-state officially approved media “carrying economic information to serve 
the Party’s mission to revitalizing the economy” (Pan, 2005). Advertisement was 
legitimatized. This is another case where media practitioners moved in advance of policy 
makers. In 1979 Shanghai TV aired the first TV commercial in China: a 90-second 
advertisement of Chinese medical wine (Weber, 2000, p. 264).  
These initial attempts inspired media organizations, under unprecedented 
financial pressure due to subsidy cuts, to cultivate advertisement as their primary source 
of income. Meanwhile, the overall economic growth in China provides abundant 
opportunities for them.  
The biggest growth spur of the advertising industry arrived after Deng Xiaoping’s 
1992 southern tour. With the surge of the general economy and the rise of consumerism 
in the early 1990s, the advertising industry soared. According to industry statistics, the 
annual growth rate between 1992 and 1994 was 93% and 97%. In the 1990s the 
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advertising revenue of China’s media increased 20-fold to RMB 80 billion (about 10 
billion U.S. dollars), with an annual growth rate of 35 %—a more profitable investment 
than tobacco (Yu, 2002). By 2001, China’s advertising industry involved 78,000 
organizational entities that employed more than 709,000 people. During this period, 
practically all of the world’s top advertising agencies set up branches in China (Paek & 
Pan, 2004).  
China’s joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) began the third stage of 
media commercialization, that is, media conglomeration (Lee et al., 2007 ; Lee et al., 
2006; Zhao, 2000). The government officials feared that joining the WTO would invite 
severe competition from foreign media groups. Domestic media, which only had operated 
in a quasi market environment for less than 20 years, might lose ground in front of 
powerful overseas competitors.  To absorb the impact of globalization and also to 
consolidate media control, the party-state took the initiative to organize domestic media 
into media groups, often in the form of monopolistic conglomerates. The concern over 
post-WTO foreign competition was so serious that most media organizations sent 
managers abroad to learn how western media groups operate. China’s first conglomerate, 
the Guangzhou Daily group, was launched in the southern city of Guangzhou in 1996. By 
the year of 2004, there were 38 press groups, eight radio and television groups, and three 
motion picture groups in China.  
Several accounts should be given to the trajectory of the formation of press 
conglomerates (Lee et al., 2006). First, administrative fiat of the party-state fostered 
much of the media conglomeration to preempt foreign competition. Second, media from 
the same geographic region often conglomerated in the same news group. In fact, the 
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names of most media conglomerates contain names of certain geographic zones, such as 
Guangzhou Daily Group, Shanghai Media Group, Sichuan Daily group, etc. It is easy to 
identify to which region a group belongs merely by reading its name. This is actually a 
residue of the party-press system, where regional media simply served as a propaganda 
apparatus of regional administration. It also reflects the involvement of regional 
government in the formation of conglomerates. Third, media conglomerates benefited 
from the phenomenal growth of the advertising industry, and have accumulated 
extraordinary wealth. Between 1988 and 1998, the annual rate of return for Chinese 
newspapers ranged between 17 and 50 percent. As of 1998, print and broadcasting media 
were among the top four sources of tax revenue for the Chinese state (Kuhn, 2001).  
Fourth, media conglomerates are preferred to non-conglomerates. They are allowed to 
expand through acquisition and to venture into non-media business, such as real estate.  
The last and most interesting account concerns the internal diversification of 
media organizations. Each press conglomerate has one “parent” paper, which is the 
original party organ that serves the wishes of Party Bosses. These “parent” papers are 
often so dull that they do not make much profit from the market. Even The People’s 
Daily, the organ of the central committee of the Party, suffered a circulation drop from 8 
million to 2 million between 1980 and 1996 (Zhao, 2000). But that does not bother the 
press groups at all. They never expected the “parent” papers to perform well in the 
market. After all, they are there to please the Party. The formation of the press groups 
resulted in a variety of “offspring” papers, designed to cater the wants of the masses. 
Then they share profits. An example is the formation of Wenhui-Xinmin press group 
from Shanghai (Lee et al., 2007 ). Wenhui Daily is a national level party-organ while 
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Xinmin Evening News was the organ of Shanghai city government. The marriage of these 
two papers designated them different roles: Weihui Daily remained to be the party organ 
and “parent” paper while Xinmin Evening News shrugs off its Party jacket to become a 
profitable “offspring” paper. A quote from former general manager of the press group, 
Gu Xingwei, calls for “short, shorter and soft, softer stories to readers ranging from age 8 
to age 80” (Lee et al., 2007 p. 28) as a marketing strategy for Xinmin Evening News. . 
Likewise, some pages of a news paper serve the Party while other pages please the 
market. 
Two decades of commercialization of the Communist Party saw the emergence 
of multiple structures of power and interests that produce greater leeway for the media 
in China’s rigid context (Lee et al., 2007 p. 27). Scholars and journalists in the Western 
world, such as Lee, Pan, and Hu, Zengjun Peng, argue that instead of a totalitarian 
system, media in China have transformed into an authoritarian system reigned by the by 
two masters of state power and market forces.  The clash between these two powers 
provides challenges and opportunities to Chinese media, rendering an interesting 
subject to study.  As Lee (2000) pointed out, while the new media market is 
redistributing symbolic power from the Party-state, the western-style democracy is 
hardly a possibility in China.  Instead, the Chinese media system is moving from 
totalitarian system to market authoritarian system.  
The tension between the constraining forces of communist political and 
ideological control and the liberating force of the market economy  (Chan, 1993, 1995; 
Pan, 2000; Zhang, 1993) remains constant. Having to please “two masters” often 
frustrates Chinese journalists (Lee, 2000, p. 562; Pan, 2000, p. 257). When the 
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government terminated subsidies to most media in 1987, journalists and media managers 
had no guidelines for or experience with appealing to a mass audience in the market 
setting, and yet were expected to adhere to the Party line at the same time. They were 
compelled to improvise a variety of seemingly paradoxical editorial or marketing 
strategies. As a result, ideological diversion and depoliticized entertainment became the 
staple of Chinese media supply (Lee, 2000).  
Pan (2000) has used the term “spatial re-configuration” to characterize the 
transformation of China’s Party-press system. After years of struggle to cope both with 
the Party line and market competition, China’s media system has developed “core” and 
“periphery zones.”  The “core” consists of Party ideology, key party organs, and front 
page news and editorials. The more centrally a media organization or a practice’ location 
in this system, the less likely it is to change. Consequently, reform and market 
competition often take place in the periphery zones. As described by Pan, the result of 
this unique “core-periphery” dynamic yields an interesting cultural phenomenon in 
China’s media system:  
Big papers are dull and small papers are hot…The front page of a 
paper is boring while the entertainment or weekend sections are lively. 
The flagship paper of a media organization is often numbingly boring 
while its spin-off publications are sharp. Journalists covering political and 
economic beats are usually dull while those working on special 
assignments or covering cultural affairs become ‘hot-shots’ (p. 274). 
Consistent with Pan’s argument, political news is in the core and social news is in 
the periphery zone; party organs are in the core and commercial media are in the 
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periphery zone; Beijing is in the core and remote inland and costal regions of 
China are in the periphery zone.  
Media regionalization in China 
China’s media have a very strong regional element.  Although China’s media 
system remains strictly controlled, the introduction of market forces has greatly altered 
the original power structure in the past three decades. The trend of media regionalization 
goes hand in hand with market-oriented reforms. Before the reforms, China’s media 
system was a hierarchy laid out and controlled by various geographic levels. Using Pan’s 
(2000) idea of spatial configuration, the central media were at the core while the regional 
media were in the periphery zones. Since the reforms mostly took place in the periphery 
zones, regional media earned more autonomy and were more commercialized than central 
media. Tunstall (2007) observed three causes of this trend of regionalization. (1) Beijing 
adopted a general policy of encouragement, or at least benign tolerance, toward most 
regional and local media, the only exception being those regions primarily occupied by 
sensitive ethnic minorities, such as Tibet and Xinjiang. (2) As a consequence of 
economic reforms, China’s regions are strong, both politically and economically, and 
getting stronger. Regional governments and major employers need their own voices to be 
heard. As a consequence, regional media have also grown strong. (3) The rapid economic 
growth and profound social change taking place in different regions feed the 
regional/local media with plenty of news stories and advertising revenue. The growth of 
regional and local media industry thus has benefited greatly from the overall development.  
China also is dominated by urban nodes. Overall, China’s media system is a point 
oriented network in which the larger cities serve as significant media locations. While 
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Beijing is the obvious hub, with the most important central media and plenty of powerful 
commercial media, the capital city of a province is typically the home base of both 
province- wide and city- wide media (Tunstall, 2007). Because of the trend of 
commercialization and regionalization, competition among media in the same city or 
among media in the leading provinces is strong. To compete for more advertising revenue, 
major regional and local media strive to provide more diverse, entertaining and quality 
news service without overtly challenging the Party lines. As a result, the media continue 
moving toward regional entertainment, showbiz, crime, gossip, and sports. 
Geographically, the contrasts between two major media cities embody the tension 
between the core and the periphery zones and between state and market: Beijing and 
Guangzhou. Beijing is the center of China’s media system. As the capital of the nation, 
Beijing is the location of top party organ newspapers, China Central Television (CCTV), 
China Central Radio, and the headquarters of Xinhua News Agency.  It is also the 
location of the Propaganda Ministry of the Party’s Central Committee and the center of 
media regulation. In most occasions, the voice of the Party is published first in Beijing 
Media and then transmitted throughout the entire nation. Beijing is the center of state 
power, the core of the political news network. Guangzhou is the capital city of 
Guangdong and the center of the Pearl Delta, which served as the “test field” for most of 
China’s reform policies in the 1980s and 1990s, and therefore is the most innovative and 
dynamic area of the country. The Pearl Delta encompasses Hong Kong and the pioneer 
cities of China’s reforms: Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Dongguan.  If China is now the world’s 
factory, then the Pearl Delta is China’s biggest workshop. This area has served as the 
leader in Chinese media innovation as well, especially in alternative newspapers. 
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Guangzhou is the media center of the Pearl Delta and The Guangzhou Daily News Group 
comprised first media group in China (Lee et al., 2006). Newspapers from Gurangzhou, 
such as Southern Weekend (Nanfang Zhoumo) and Southern Metropolitan Daily 
(Nanfang Dushibao), are widely regarded as the most daring and respectable media in 
mainland China. An example of this cutting-edge reporting includes a story on how Sun 
Zhigang, an immigrant worker in Guangzhou, was beaten to death by local policeman in 
2003. Their report not only quickly caught national attention but also forced the Chinese 
government to renounce an unpopular law that authorized local police to detain 
unregistered immigrant workers.  
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou are three top metropolises in China. Together, 
they accounted for 3.6% of the national population, 11.4% of national GDP and more 
than 10% of Chinese Internet users by the end of 2006 (Baidu, 2007; CNNIC, Jan 2007; 
中华人民共和国民政部, 2006). They also represent China’s top three advertising 
markets. Beijing captures 25% of the national total and Shanghai and Guangzhou each 
take 10%, respectively (Lee et al., 2006, p. 587). 
Lee and colleagues (2007 ) compared the media landscapes of Beijing, Shanghai 
and Guangzhou. Beijing is the national capital and media center. Top party organs, such 
as People’s Daily, CCTV, and China Daily call it home, and it headquarters China’ 
official wire service provider, the Xinhua News Agency. It is also home to powerful local 
media such as the Beijing Daily, and Beijing Youth Daily. Various ministries, 
departments, and functional bodies all have their own media outlets. Examples of these 
media outlets include the organ of China Youth League, China Youth Daily, which 
enjoys national circulation and a reputation of outspokenness. Beijing also hosts a variety 
 46
of tabloids. Some of them specialized in serving the lives of local residents; some 
specialized in reporting entertainment news or sports news. Three out of China’s top four 
online portal sites have their headquarters in Beijing. Although some of the top media 
outlets sell nationally, most of them compete horizontally in the local market. Lee 
characterized media in Beijing as “managed diversity,” where they take extra precautions 
to balancing influences from different lines of government as well as to the pressure from 
the market.  
Shanghai is China’s economic capital and largest city and home to three big 
media conglomerates: Jiefang Daily Press Group, the Wenhui-Xinmin Press Group and 
the Shanghai Media Group. According to Lee and colleagues, the political economy in 
Shanghai is “big city, small place.” It is a big city because of its prosperous economy. 
The media advertising revenue in Shanghai totaled to RMB $20 billion, or US $2.5 
billion, in the year 2006.  The government of Shanghai commands unrivaled economic 
resources so that authorities can incorporate media into the “prescribed orbit” (p.25). It is 
also a small place in terms of homogeneity. In contrast to Beijing and Guangzhou, 
Shanghai lacks diversity in media voices and expressions of different interests. The 
powerbase of this city is so compact that orders from the core of the power structure to 
individuals are quick and direct, enabling efficient media control.  
Guangzhou holds a unique position in the recent history of the reform and open 
era. It is where reforms start, where new ideas, models and policies were put into test. It 
often provides alternative opinions, views, and practices. Part of Guangzhou’s difference 
stems from its geographical distance from the political center of Beijing. Guangzhou is 
located in the southern costal area called Pearl Delta, close to Hong Kong. Pearl Delta is 
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China’s largest manufacture base and export center. Home to most of the products 
labeled “made in China” and shipped all over the world, here, private enterprises prosper 
and foreign investments are abundant. Although its supremacy in manufacturing is 
challenged by the Yangtze Delta in recent years, the Pearl Delta has cultivated a media 
landscape in Guangzhou that is quite different from Beijing and Shanghai.  
Lee and colleagues summarize Guangzhou’s media as “market competition within 
the party-state ideological limits.” Although Guangzhou is only the sixth biggest city in 
terms of population, it exceeds both Beijing and Shanghai in media reach. Hong Kong 
television broadcasts filter across into the entire Pearl Delta, influencing ordinary citizens 
and media practitioners alike. Guangzhou Daily is the first press group and top revenue 
earner of China. Another press group from Guangzhou, Nanfang Daily group earned a 
national reputation of outspokenness by its two maverick “offspring” papers of the 
Nanfang Daily group: Southern Metropolitan Daily (Nanfang Dushibao) and Southern 
Weekend (Nanfang Zhoumo).  These two papers sit at the national forefront of 
investigative reporting. They advocate liberal ideas and expose wrongdoings of 
government officials. The Sun Zhigang case, as mention above, was first published in 
Southern Metropolitan Daily in Guangzhou and quickly caught national attention.  
A survey (Pan & Chan, 2003) on Chinese journalists shows that younger and 
reform-minded journalists looked up to Southern Weekend as an exemplar of professional 
journalism. These two papers earn their reputation at a price: their senior editors are 
frequently replaced by angry officials. 
The old party press system of China is a network led by national organs located in 
Beijing and supported by province-level organs headquartered in the capital cities of 
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China’s provinces in conjunction with other administrative  apparatuses (Chan, 1993). 
Therefore province capitals are regional media hubs which function as the backbone of 
China’s network of news production. After years of media reforms, although some 
noncapital cities (such as Shenzhen) have cultivated a prosperous media industry and 
some province capitals (such as Chengdu and Changsha) are much more visible than its 
peers in China’s media landscape, province capitals still remain the media centers of 
provinces. The media conglomeration further strengthened the province capitals’ hub 
status; almost all media groups are headquartered in Big Three and province capitals. The 
only exception is two municipalities, Chongqing and Tianjin. Municipalities are a very 
special kind of city. Because of their importance, these cities are regarded as provinces in 
terms of administration. Like all other provinces, the municipalities have an entire set of 
media. They are also regional media hubs.  
Other cities may also have their newspapers and TV stations, etc., but they are not 
hubs large as the province capitals and municipalities. The rural areas of China are almost 
negligible in China’s map of media distribution. There is simply no known media based 
in rural China.  
China’s online news services 
Since the mid-1990s, Internet growth has surged in China. According to the 
January 2010 semi-annual Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in 
China (CNNIC, 2010), by the end of 2009, there were 16.82 million domain names, 3.23 
million websites and 33.6 billions of Webpages located in China. This country has the 
world’s largest population of Internet users: 384 million. The national penetration rate 
was 28.9%, higher than the global average.  More than 90% of Chinese Internet users 
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accessed the Internet by broadband, while 8% of them are by mobile-only users. The 
majority of Internet users are male (54.2%), young (83% of them are under the age of 40), 
and urban dwellers (72.2%).  One major trend is that Chinese Internet uses continue to 
penetrate into the lower education group. The largest education group of Internet users is 
high school (40.2%). Internet users with some college education used to make up of more 
than half of the entire online population by the end of 2006 (CNNIC, 2007). Now they 
only account for one third (34.3%) of Chinese Internet users.  
The distribution of Internet users in different regions of China is not even.  Two 
largest cities, Beijing and Shanghai, have a penetrate rate of more than 60%. Among all 
provinces, Guangdong has the most Internet users (48.6 million) and the highest 
penetration rate (50.9%). Tibet has the least Internet users (0.53 million), and Guizhou 
has the lowest penetration rate (15.1%). The provinces located in east costal regions have 
a penetration rate higher than the national average of 28.9%, while provinces located in 
the vast inland and remote regions of China tend to rate below national average. It is 
found that the development level of a province’s economic development is positively 
correlated with the province’s Internet development. The higher a province’s per capital 
GDP, the higher its Internet penetration rate and vice versa. Meanwhile, the provinces 
with the lowest penetration rates also have the highest growth rate (about 50% annual 
increase) (CNNIC, 2010).  
Also unevenly distributed are domain names. According to the January 2007 
survey from CNNIC, Beijing alone has about 20% of all domain names. Guangdong 
(15.6% of all domain names) and Shanghai (9.2% of all domain names) ranked second 
and third. In terms of providing content, Guangdong could compete with Beijing as a 
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region, for Guangdong contains the highest percentage of all websites in China (18.3%) 
(CNNIC, 2007).   
The primary application of the Internet in China is online music (83.5%), with 
news reading a close second (80.1%) and search engine being the third (73.3%). The 
population of Chinese online news readers has reached 307.69 million in 2009, with 
annual increase of 31.5% (CNNIC, 2010).  
The Internet already plays an important role in Chinese news media. With more 
than 300 million online news readers and fast increasing advertisement revenue, the 
Internet is already an established channel where ordinary Chinese folks getting their new 
from. How does the Internet affect China’s existing media system? As in the other parts 
of the world, the impact of the Internet may come from different angles, with each angle 
associated with one of the Internet’s unique attributes, such as instant upgrades, 
multimedia, and interaction between the user and the information provider. This study is 
only concerned with the network feature of online news.  
The Internet links up the news reports of geographically scattered local media and 
creates a national online news network. Official media like the People’s Daily and CCTV 
have had a national market for a long time. Local media, especially the local daily 
newspapers, could hardly reach a non-local audience before most of the media in China 
began to launch their own websites in the late 1990s. For strong media like the Southern 
Metropolitan Daily, a major commercial daily, the Internet provides an effective channel 
for reaching a national audience. For some weak dailies, the Internet provides an extra 
daily feed of additional news, news ideas and examples of practicing journalism. Readers 
of online news can now not only pay attention to what Beijing is saying or what is 
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happening in their local community but also follow hot stories that take place in other 
parts of the country. In other words, local media now have to compete for attention with 
all of China in this cyber news space. Consequently, local news stories can now become 
national news issues in the cyber news space. In the past, negative news story in one city 
often do not appear in the local media of that city, but in media from other cities, 
especially media from the Pearl Delta. Since all media share one national network of 
online news, local governments have less ability to “contain” negative news stories 
within their “territory.”  
The Internet also provides an alternative route for foreign news. This does not 
suggest that many Chinese people read news from foreign websites. Language proves to 
be a big barrier to an ordinary Chinese citizen’s access to foreign media. Government 
blocking is another. Jack Linchuan Qiu (2000) has argued that instead of a global cyber 
space the Internet has been divided into multiple cyber spaces. Due to the efforts of the 
Chinese government, there exists a virtual border between China’s “domestic cyber 
space” and “foreign cyberspace.” However, the researcher’s personal observation is that 
the Internet at least has changed the Xinhua News Agency’s near monopoly of foreign 
news supply. In the past, only very few elite media in China, such as the People’s Daily, 
could afford to send their own journalists overseas to cover foreign news. In most 
occasions, ordinary media in China have had to depend on the Xinhua News Agency for 
foreign news. With the Internet, news editors now have access to an unlimited foreign 
news supply from the global cyber news space. Although they can not just copy and paste 
every story they find in the “foreign cyber news space,” it does provide the ordinary 
Chinese media a supplemental dose of foreign news. This kind of news tends to belong to 
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the “peripheral” categories like entertainment, sports, and technology. On the other hand, 
foreign correspondents, who often are based in major cities like Beijing and Shanghai, 
also receive help from online news from inland China’s local media.  
Unlike in the United States, where the websites of major media like CNN and the 
New York Times represent important hubs of online news, in China the major sources of 
news for online users are commercial portals (Wu, 2005). China’s cyber news space 
started to take shape when the Hangzhou Daily launched the first website of a Chinese 
media in 1995 (Qiang, 2003). In 1997, the People’s Daily and the Xinhua News Agency 
launched their own websites. By the end of the twentieth century, most of the traditional 
media in China had an online version (Xiao & Polumbaum, 2006). The online versions of 
these media undoubtedly construct an important part of contemporary China’s cyber 
news space.  However, these traditional media-backed websites are primitive both in 
content and format. Unlike the state-run media and their websites, commercial portals in 
China are all private enterprises. Most of them were started by U.S. venture capital, their 
founders often hold an advanced degree from American universities, and their stocks are 
exchanged on the NASDAQ. In the early days of China’s Internet, the portals were much 
more sophisticated in using the innovations of online technology than the state-run online 
news sources. They provided numerous stories daily, added multimedia and interactive 
features to their Webpages, and used hyperlinks to back their news stories with related 
information and background. They were especially good at compiling and packaging 
news stories to attract their readers. Naturally, the portals quickly surpassed the state-run 
online sources in traffic and became major players of Internet news. According to 
Alexa’s world website ranking (by traffic), four out of the top ten websites in China are 
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commercial portals (the rest are search engines, networking sites and online vendors). 
Among them, HTUwww.qq.comUTH ranked number 2, HTUwww.sina.comUTH ranked number 3, 
HTUwww.163.comUTH ranked number 5, and HTUwww.sohu.comUTH ranked number 7 (Alexa, 2008), 
whereas none of China’s state-owned online media made the top 50 list. Henceforth, 
these portals referenced as QQ, Sina, Netease (another name of 163), and Sohu, 
respectively. 
  These portals share many similarities. They are all founded in the late 1990s 
when the “dot com” boom reached China. The early forerunners, Sina and Sohu, 
followed the business model of Yahoo. Even today, the homepages of these four portals 
still look similar to American portal sites such as Yahoo! and MSN.  They all provide 
abundant and well organized news stories every day. But news is not the only service that 
these portals provide. Services like email, online shopping, blog supports, e-book reading, 
search engines, online maps, chat rooms, online gaming, etc. are also available. 
According to a report by CCIDNET (2006), a market research website, the competition 
between Chinese portals is fierce. Each portal strives to find its best market niche.  Sina’s 
strength lies in providing timely and complete news coverage. It is considered as the best 
news website in China. It provides far more daily stories than other portals. Sina used to 
be the number one portal in China until QQ caught up in 2003. QQ is China’s version of 
MSN instant messaging. It is the most popular online IM tool among Chinese users. Just 
like MSN, QQ links its IM function with its portal service. Because of the popularity of 
the IM tool QQ, the portal qq.com surpassed Sina as China’s most visited portal. News 
service is not the priority of QQ.  Netease (HTUwww.163.comUTH) tries to attract news readers by 
providing better in-depth reports. Sohu tries to survive by buying in smaller websites 
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which provide a variety of online services, such as online map, mp3 search engine, text 
message, and online gaming. News service is still a major part of Sohu’s business.  Today, 
the term “online news” still means portal news to the majority of Chinese Internet users, 
not the online version of any traditional media.  
Since they are private enterprises, the commercial portals are not under direct 
control of the Chinese government. That distinguishes them from the traditional media in 
China. However, this does not mean that the portals can publish anything as they wish. 
The government has passed a series of specific regulations to supervise commercial 
portals. One of the most restrictive regulations is that commercial portals cannot produce 
original news (Xiao & Polumbaum, 2006). They can only utilize news stories from 
websites of traditional news organizations from mainland China. Nonetheless, the portals 
perform much better than the online versions of traditional news papers because by 
copying and pasting from news organizations all over China, they provide timelier, more 
comprehensive, and better organized reports of events. The non-news services available 
on these portals may be another reason that they enjoy high traffic. Another consequence 
of government regulation is that the commercial portals tend to avoid sensitive political 
topics and emphasize news in the peripheral categories like crime, entertainment, and 
sports.  
A brief summary 
According to Castells, the Internet is not only shaping life, it is being shaped by 
life at the same time. As online news production and distribution becoming mainstream 
practices in China, the structure of the network of online news production is also being 
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shaped by real life conditions of China. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce these 
real life conditions and put the analysis of China’s cyber news space into context.  
The topologists, such as Barabasi, proposed laws that govern the Internet: the 
growth rule and the preferential attachment. However, the abstract laws do not work 
without certain social historical context. After more than one decade’s fast diffusion, it is 
already part of people’s everyday reality. Tremayne has successfully combined the rules 
and norms of news production in reality with the abstract laws in his analyses of news 
websites and blogs. According to him, the principle of preferential attachment opens 
doors to real life factors. What this chapter tries to do is to discuss the factors that may 
have affected the linking preferences in China’s cyber news space.   
China has gone through more than three decades of media reforms. Two major 
processes involved in the reforms are media commercialization and media regionalization. 
It is through these two processes that the China’s media system has broken away from the 
old party-press system and developed the unique “core vs. periphery” dynamic, as Pan 
put it (2000).  During commercialization, the organs of China’s party press system have 
founded a number of spin-off media. These so-called “offspring” media are very market-
oriented. They often functions as cash cows of their media group. They do not have the 
same political importance as the organs of the same group but they financially support 
organs. The development of local media market brought in strong regional factor in 
China’s media system. Although Beijing remains to be the national media center, 
regional media hubs have also emerged. Regional media provides a much more 
diversified picture of what is going on throughout the entire nation. This study proposes 
that the type (organ vs. commercial) and geographic location of each news organization 
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are two factors of preferential attachment in China’s cyber news space. The following 
























Research questions and hypotheses 
Research questions  
Barabasi and others (Barabasi, 2002; Huberman, 2001; Watts, 2003) have 
theorized that the power law rules the Internet. That is, a minority of nodes take the 
majority of resources, be it links, traffic, or attention. Empirical studies have provided 
evidences to support this theory: Barabasi found (2002) that 80% of all hyperlinks on the 
Web point to only 15% of all web pages existing at that time; Adamic and Huberman 
(2000) found that only a small number of websites attract most online traffic; and while 
some star websites contain numerous web pages, most websites are not composed of very 
many web pages (Adamic, 1999). Likewise, this pattern should be observed in China’s 
network of online news production: 
RQ1: Does the distribution of portal story links among online news 
organizations show a pattern similar to the power law?  
          If the power law distribution holds true, it is natural to ask the location of the hubs, 
leading to the following additional research questions:  
RQ2:  From which online news organizations are stories most likely to be 
linked by the portals?  
Similar to research question one, research question 3 is designed to check 
if there is a pattern of concentration among production sites.  
RQ3: Does the distribution of links among production sites show a pattern 
similar to the power law?  
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And, if there is such a pattern of concentration, then where are hubs of 
online news productions? 
RQ4:  In which places are stories produced which are most likely to be 
linked by the portals? 
As stated above, different regions in China have different degrees of 
representation in the cyber news space. Being prominent in the cyber news space 
empowers geographic localities. It is important to map the distribution of “online 
prominence” among different places in China. Future studies could compare this map 
with the geographic distribution of traditional media in China to see how the Internet may 
have redistributed media power on mainland China. Such a map may also help 
researchers of China’s media markets to answer questions of audience and the reach of 
online media.  This leads to research question 5: 
RQ5: How are different provinces in China connected and represented in 
the cyber news space?  
There are two measures of how a province is linked to the network of news 
production. One is the number of links, that is, the hyperlink that portals use to connect to 
the media from each province. The more links a province receives, the more its media 
contributed to the network, and the more active its media production. The other measure 
is representation, meaning the frequency with which a province is represented in the 
media content. Each story has a place element, and each place belongs to a province. 
Each time a place from a certain province was coded as the main place element of a story; 
this province was coded as being represented once. The measure of representation 
reflects how much media spotlights a province receives.  
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Answers to research question 5 can be sought by applying Zook’s measure of ICQ 
(introduced in Chapter 2). This present study uses two measures formulated after Zook’s 
ICQ to gauge the disparity between different provinces in terms of their connection to 
cyber news space. Note that China has 32 province-level administrations, including the 
four municipalities: Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing. The first measure, called 
Cyber-news-space Production Quotient (CPQ), is about the relationship between the links 
that websites from a province have attracted (connections) and the number of Internet 
users in that province. The formula for CPQ is  
. . . . . .
. . . s.in. .
. . . s.in. . . . . .
. .int . s.in
Numberof linksa provincehasattracted
Numberof Internetuser a provinceCPQ Numberof total link thecyber newsspaceinChina
Numberof ernetuser China
=   (2) 
 
The second measure, called Cyber-news-space Representation Quotient (CRQ), 
involves the relationship between the times that places from a province have been 
represented (representation) and the number of Internet users in that province. The 
formula of CRQ is  
. . . . . . .
. . . s.in. .
. . . . . . . . . .
. .int . s.in
Number of timesa provincehasbeenrepresented
Number of Internet user a provinceCRQ Number of total timesthat placesinChinahasbeenrepresented
Numberof ernet user China
=   (3) 
 
CCQ greater than 1 means a strong connection with China’s cyber news space; on 
the other hand, CCQ smaller than 1 means a weak connection. CRQ greater than 1 means 
strong representation in China’s cyber news space, and CRQ smaller than 1 means weak 
representation in China’s cyber news space. CCQ and CRQ allow the construction of a 2 
by 2 matrix (as shown in Figure 3) in which provinces can be placed according to 
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whether they are heavily linked to China’s cyber news space and whether they are 
heavily represented in China’s cyber news space. 
 
Figure 3: Production vs. representation matrix 
production links 
  CCQ>1 CCQ<1 
CRQ>1 media hub Exporter media 
representation CRQ<1 importer average nodes
 
The first cell, indicating the national center, includes provinces where the media 
are linked heavily to the cyber news space and, consequently, the representations of these 
provinces in the cyber news space also are strong. The author expects Beijing to be in this 
cell.  However, a place with strong media does not necessarily mean the representation of 
this place in the cyber news space is as strong. The possibility remains that media in these 
places tend to report national news other than local news. The second cell, media hub, 
includes places with strong media industry and connection to the national cyber news 
space, but the places themselves are relatively less often represented. Media in 
Guangdong province are strong and are famous for reporting news that takes place in 
other parts of China. Thus it is possible that Guangdong province is in this cell. The third 
cell, the attention hub, includes places that do not have a strong connection with China’s 
cyber news space but somehow have frequent representation. The fourth cells, by-passed 
nodes, are places where both the connection and representation are weak, such as some 
remote inland provinces. These are places that are at a disadvantage in China’s cyber 
news space. 
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The rest of the research questions are about foreign news. China has been 
criticized as constructing a ‘great firewall” which obstructs the flow of foreign 
information into the “domestic” online news network of China. Where are the gates of 
the “great firewall”, who controls the flow of foreign news and what kinds of foreign 
news pass through? The last group of research questions asks.  
RQ6: Which websites are hubs for foreign news?  
RQ7: News from which countries is most likely to be linked to the online news 
network (or portals) of China?  
 
Hypotheses 
The first set of hypotheses proposes to test factors that may affect the number of 
links that each online news outlet would receive from portals. This research tests two 
major factors: media types and their geographic locations. Media type refers to whether a 
medium is a party/government organ or a commercial one. Geographic location concerns 
a medium’s location: the top three cities of China (Big Three), provincial capitals and 
municipalities, or other cities. 
After almost three decades of media reforms, all media in China can be identified 
as either organ media or commercial media. Before the reforms, only organ media existed. 
They primarily function as mouthpieces of the Communist Party of China (CCP) and the 
Chinese government. From the state to provinces to major municipalities, each level of 
the CCP and government hierarchy has its own mouthpieces. Some major ministries at 
the state level have their own mouthpiece, as well (the Legal Daily of the Ministry of 
Justice, for example). All organ media explicitly identify themselves as the organ media 
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of certain CCP branch or government ministries. The mission statement from each one’s 
website carries such easily recognized self identification. Various media reforms 
introduced commercial media. To cater to the audience and therefore to attract advertisers, 
organ media launched a variety of so-called offspring media in the early 1990s.  Organ 
media have to function strictly as mouthpieces, but these offspring media were born with 
only one purpose: profit.  They provide the public with much more colorful news on 
periphery topics such as entertainment, sports, and human interest stories, and serve the 
local community with practical, everyday information. There are certain redlines that 
these offspring media can not cross, otherwise they completely embody commercial 
organizations, just like their western counterparts. So the author labeled them as 
commercial media. Commercial media quickly became so profitable that the media 
industry is only slightly less lucrative than the tobacco industry. In the late 1990s, 
China’s party-state initiated a campaign of media conglomeration that consolidated media 
from the same region into two or three press groups. Each press group consists of a major 
organ medium and several commercial media. Organ media serve as the head of each 
press group while commercial media are dedicated ‘cash cows’. Overall, the media 
industry in China has enjoyed prosperity in recent years. There are many more 
commercial media than there are organ media.  
Organ media vs. commercial media, which one would a portal choose? Put 
another way, as a news organization, how would a portal site make a choice between 
organ media and commercial media when republishing news stories from various news 
outlets? Essentially, this remains a gatekeeping question at the organization level. 
Gatekeeping, from the perspective of organizations, is a “series of transactions between 
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one organization and those external to it” (Shoemaker, 1991, p. 57). Inputs are messages 
that come to the door steps of the communication organization, while outputs are those 
selected and published. When selecting inputs, gatekeepers use internal criteria 
established by the news organization; when selecting outputs, gatekeepers use external 
criteria established by the perceived message recipients.  
In the online environment, a portal site literally has unlimited messages just a 
click away; it must continuously make decisions of inclusion or exclusion in order to 
maintain its 24/7 non-stop news supply. Portal news editors choose stories according to 
values, rules and routines of the portal site. Then these news editors filter, manipulate and 
repackage these stories as a working routine for the portal.  Only a subset of the included 
material will be published. And the published content depends on the criteria of perceived 
readers of portal news. Therefore, to answer the question of whether a portal prefers 
organ media or commercial media, it is better to look at what kinds of organizations that 
China’s portal sites are and what comprises their audience.  
According to the self exclamation (available in their “about us” pages) of the four 
portal sites’ in this study, they are all private companies. Three of them are listed on the 
NASDAQ stock market, the other is listed on the main board of the Hong Kong stock 
market. They are dedicated to providing information services to Chinese communities 
both in and outside the People’s Republic of China. They emphasize that their services 
are “value-added” and toast their provision of “a broad array of choices regarding 
information, entertainment and communication”. No wonder that literature on China’s 
portals label them as “commercial online media” (Wu, 2005; Xiao & Polumbaum, 2006). 
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It is reasonable to speculate that the internal criteria of the portal sites would prefer 
stories from commercial media.  
On the other hand, according to the annul Statistical Survey Report on the Internet 
Development in China (CNNIC, 2010), the online news readers in China are young. They 
use the Internet as their primary approach to obtain information, and online news is their 
second most utilized Internet service, next only to online music. They are quite versatile 
in using online services and functions. It is hard to imagine that this population of online 
news readers would prefer dull organ media over hot commercial media (Pan, 2000). So 
the criteria of the perceived audience of portal news should also make more stories from 
commercial media to be published. Therefore, the first hypothesis reads:   
H1a: The more heavily linked online news outlets tend to be commercial 
media. 
In China the commercial portals are just news aggregators and distributors. They 
can not legally produce original news. All of the four portals under study are national 
news platforms. These portals collect news stories from media all over China, repackage 
them and provide them to a national audience. In other words, a portal news reader would 
face an aggregation of news stories produced by media across the country, no matter 
where this reader lives. This is certainly quite different from the traditional news 
reading/viewing experience where the local media dominate. So, when portals make their 
selection of news stories from various media, do they have any preference over media 
with certain geographic locations? The answer should be yes.  
Gatekeeping studies found that when a news outlet uses stories from other 
organizations, its practices are influenced by the actions of previous gatekeepers. A study 
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by Whitney and Becker (1981)found that the proportion of news stories from newspaper 
editors’ selection tended to be roughly the same as the proportion of news stories from 
the outputs of wire services. It is reasonable to expect that commercial portals’ 
gatekeeping practices follow the same rule. The geographic proportion of portals news 
should match the geographic distribution of previous gatekeepers: online news 
organizations where portals get their news.  In other words, the commercial portals’ daily 
news provision should comprise more news produced in places with high media density 
and less news produced in places with low media density. For any individual news 
organization, there should be a correlation between its geographic location and the 
number of links it receives from the commercial portals.  
Geographic distribution of media has been a hot topic ever since the beginning of 
the Internet. The Internet was prophesied as a net that erases geography, distance, and all 
other physical and social barriers of communication (Zook, in press).  However, 
empirical studies (Goldsmith & Wu, 2006; Murnion & Healy, 1998) have found that 
geography continues to play an important role in online communication. After all, every 
computer (or any other Internet gear) has a location, so does the person before the 
monitor. The Internet redefines space “very much like railways defined ‘economic 
regions’ and ‘national markets’ in the industry economy” (Castells, 2000, p. 443). It’s a 
mutual process. While the railway redefines space, geographic properties such as terrain, 
distance, and community also defines the shape of a railway system. Likewise, these 
geographic properties also shape the Internet and online communication.  In this present 
study, the author would argue that the geographic location of the online news 
organizations is another factor affecting the linking pattern of the network of online news 
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production in China. This effect transpires through each single action of preferential 
attachment by portal editors.    
In this study, there are three values of the variable of geographic location: the Big 
Three, provincial capitals and municipalities, and other cities. The Big Three refers to the 
cities of Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. Beijing is the national capital. Shanghai is the 
economic capital; Guangzhou has served for more than 30 years as the frontier of 
economic reforms and media center where the most alternative voices and deviant ideas 
from Beijing would be found in mainland China. By 2006, the Big Three accounted for 
3.6% of national population, 11.4% of national GDP, and 45% of advertising revenue 
(Lee et al., 2006, p. 587). Provincial capitals are media centers of each province. In the 
old party-press system, each level of the government administration had its own 
propaganda apparatus. The two pillars comprising this party-press system were state 
media, usually located in Beijing, and the province level media located in the capital 
cities of each province. That made province capital cities regional media centers. Even 
after all these years of reforms, capital cities’ status as regional media centers remains. 
Actually, most capital cities are also the political, economic, and population centers of 
their provinces. Municipalities are a special kind of city. Each municipality has the same 
political status as an entire province. They are all giant metro centers. There are only four 
municipalities in China: Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing. Since Beijing and 
Shanghai are grouped as part of the Big Three, Tianjin and Chongqing are left with the 
province capitals. Both of them are also regional media hubs. There are cities that are 
neither province capitals nor municipalities and yet influential, such as Shenzhen, Suzhou, 
and Dalian. However, none of them are media hubs like the province capitals. Therefore, 
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all other cities are grouped together. There is not a single news organization based in the 
rural areas. After all, the media industry belongs to urban society. In summation, in 
China’s current media system, the Big Three are national centers, provincial capitals are 
regional hubs, and other cities are ordinary nodes.  
 It is reasonable to expect that the commercial portals’ geographic linking pattern 
reflects the reality of the geographic distribution of media in China. That is, media from 
the Big Three receive the most number of links from commercial portals, followed by 
media from the province capitals and municipalities. Media from the other cities are not 
likely to receive very many links. Therefore, the next hypothesis is: 
H1b: The more central a media’s geographic location is the more links it 
receives from the commercial portals.  
To test hypotheses H1a and H1b, the researcher proposes a multiple regression model: 
1 1 2 2y x xα β β= + +                                       (4) 
Where y is the number of links that a website has attracted. 1x  (type) is the 
type of news organization behind the website. 1x  has two values: 1=organ 
medium; 2=commercial medium. 2x  (site) is the geographic location of 
the medium behind the website. 2x  has three values: 1= Big Three; 
2=provincial capitals and municipalities; 3=other cities.  
 
This multiple regression model will test whether the media type and geographic 
location of each news organization are two predictors of the number of links this news 
organization receives from the commercial portals.  
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According to Pan (2000), the structural dichotomy of China’s media system has 
developed into that of a “core” and “periphery zones”. Party ideology, politically 
sensitive issues, and organ media all belong to the “core”, while market competition, 
entertainment news, and commercial media comprise the “periphery zones”. Consistent 
with Pan’s argument, hard news is core and soft news is peripheral in nature. Could news 
type be a factor that moderates the preferential attachment decisions of portal gatekeepers? 
Do the portals link organ media for hard news and link commercial media for soft news? 
Does this core peripheral dichotomy apply to geography? Big cities are in the core and 
therefore associated with hard news? Remote places are peripheral and therefore 
associated with soft news? Before proposing any hypothesis, let’s first take a look at the 
distinction between hard news and soft news. 
The most basic distinction of news types is a dichotomy: hard news and soft news. 
Scholars from various traditions of inquiry have approached this distinction (Baum, 2002, 
2003; Boczkowski, 2009; Britannica, 2007; Carroll, 1985; Lehman-Wilzig; & Seletzky, 
2008; Patterson, 2000; Scott & Gobetz, 1992; Tuchman, 1972; Whetmore, 1987). Hard 
news is characterized as having high level of newsworthiness (Tuchman, 1972). Factually 
based (Whetmore, 1987) and public affairs related  (Boczkowski, 2009), it demands 
timely publication (Carroll, 1985; Smith, 1985). Hard news is often presented in primary 
news space, such as the front page of a news paper, the prime time of television or the 
homepage of a news website(Baum, 2002, 2003). Examples of hard news include stories 
of public policies, economics, social events, science and technology, disasters, major 
accidents, etc. (Patterson, 2000; Poindexter & Harp, 2007). Scott & Gobetz offer a 
definition of hard news that identifies it as “any story that focuses on issues of ongoing 
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policy consideration, factual accounting of current public events, or social issues and 
controversies that concern members of the audience” (1992, p. 408). Another definition 
from Patterson states that “Hard news refers to coverage of breaking events involving top 
leaders, major issues, or significant disruptions in the routines of daily life, such as an 
earthquake or airline disaster. Information about these events is presumably important to 
citizens’ ability to understand and respond to the world of public affairs” (Patterson, 2000, 
p. 3). 
Plainly defining soft news proves more difficult, although scholars and media 
professionals clearly have some notion of soft news when they use the term. In some 
cases, soft news simply is defined as the residue of hard news. Immediately following her 
definition of hard news, Patterson stated that news that is not hard is, “by definition, 
‘soft’” (Patterson, 2000, p. 3). With that said, Patterson and other scholars did attempt to 
give some better clues of what soft news is(Lehman-Wilzig; & Seletzky, 2008; Patterson, 
2000; Poindexter & Harp, 2007; Scott & Gobetz, 1992), although these clues are often 
given as the opposite of hard news. Soft news is characterized as opinion-involved and 
subjective (Lehman-Wilzig; & Seletzky, 2008), sensational (Patterson, 2000), and off 
beat and colorful (Scott & Gobetz, 1992). Examples of soft news include stories about 
trends, personalities, or lifestyles (Poindexter & Harp, 2007), gossip, local scandal ( of a 
social variety), and human interest stories, which has “little ramifications beyond their 
immediate circle”(Lehman-Wilzig; & Seletzky, 2008, p. 3) and does not require timely 
publication (Boczkowski, 2009). According to Patterson (2000), any news that meets the 
following three criteria is soft news: (1) news that has no clear connection with policy 
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issues; (2) news that is sensational, human-interest related, or incidence-based (such as a 
disaster or crime); (3) news that is more personal, subjective and less institutional. 
There has been an increase of soft news in news production in the United States in 
the past three decades (Patterson, 2000; Scott & Gobetz, 1992), an increase due to the 
entertainment value of soft news. News organizations produce more soft news as a 
strategy to attract audience and to win more market share.  
From the definition and description above, it is clear that the hard news and soft 
news dichotomy is consistent to Pan’s dichotomy of core and peripheral. Hard news 
belongs to the core and soft news belongs to the peripheral zones.  One can reasonably 
expect that hard news is associated with organ media and central locations while soft 
news is associated with commercial media and more remote places.  
H2a: News from organ media is more likely to be hard news while news 
from commercial media is more likely to be soft news.  
H2b: News produced in the Big Three is more likely to be hard news while news 



















This chapter offers a content analysis of news from China’s commercial portals. 
The focus of this study is not so much on the contents, but on linking cues imbedded in 
the contents. It is not really about the commercial portals, but the landscape of online 
news as constructed by the portals.  
Methodological difficulties  
This is a study about the distribution of links in the cyber news space. The most 
ideal approach would involve taking the Webpage as the unit of analysis, recording the 
number of links that each Webpage attracts, and even tracking the pattern of “who’s 
linked to whom.” If that was possible, then I could extensively and accurately map the 
cyber news space. Unfortunately, reality proves far more complicated, and the road to 
truth is rarely so straightforward. There are three major methodological difficulties that 
complicate this current study. These difficulties, and methods with which to cope with 
them, are discussed below.  
The very definition of China’s cyber news space poses the first difficulty. If the 
cyber space truly has no borders, then how to define an area that could be designated 
“Chinese”? No matter how virtual cyber space may look, it still has a material base. 
According to Castells’ theory about the space of flows, the cyber news space has three 
layers of material support: the network of circuits and computers, the geographic spots 
that wired by these circuits, and the people who construct and use these circuits and 
computers.  The Internet is global, but every computer has a geographic location. 
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Furthermore, people who input and retrieve information online have a location and 
citizenship. That makes the Internet subject to the controls of nations. The cyber space is 
no longer the virtual Wild West it used to be. As Goldsmith and Wu (2006) pointed out, 
the cyberspace is not truly borderless. As governments become more sophisticated in 
maintaining national borders in cyber space, scholars ask whether there is a cyberspace or 
multiple cyber spaces (Qiu, 2000). For example, the Chinese government is infamous for 
using firewalls to ward off “improper” information. People within the borders of China 
do not currently have access to common western websites such as www.facebook.com, 
www.twitter.com, www.youtube.com, www.picasa.com and www.flickr.com.  
The second difficulty is the massive size and ever-changing nature of China’s 
cyber news space. The Internet presents serious challenges to the method of content 
analysis (Neuendorf, 2002; Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 2005). According to Neuendorf, research 
on online contents is “plagued by the difficulty in establishing a population and a 
sampling frame” (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 88).   As previously stated, there are millions of 
Webpages published in China. Although they certainly are not all news Webpages, this 
figure still belies the enormous size of China’s cyber news space. Moreover, this cyber 
news space is not static. Any given minute, there are new Webpages added and old ones 
deleted; new links established and old ones removed.  
The third and maybe the toughest difficulty addressed by this study has is how to 
track the links. For any node in any network, there are two kinds of links. Those attached 
to yourself and those you attach to others. Researchers of the Internet (Berners-Lee & 
Fischetti, 1999; Brunn & Dodge, 2001; Zook, 2002) simply separate these two kinds of 
links as incoming links (IL) and outgoing links (OL). On the web, OLs are easily to 
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record: they are right there on the Webpage; but ILs are invisible to the reader of the 
Webpage. Given a Webpage, how do you know how many links are attached to it? 
Unfortunately, according to the network logic of Barabasi, ILs have more importance 
than OLs. They are the most important index of how central a node is in a network. The 
more ILs a node has, the more likely it is to become a hub. And on any network, hubs 
dominate. Search engine providers like Google seem to know the trick of recording ILs. 
They use the number of links that a page has attracted as an index to rank their search 
results. Since the algorithm of calculating incoming links lies precisely at the heart of 
what makes Google so profitable, it is no wonder all search companies want this trick up 
their proverbial sleeves. Academic researchers have to look for other clues.  
Content selection 
Based on the reasons above, this study defines China’s cyber news space as the 
collection of all news Webpages published and stored in computer hosts within the 
borders of the People’s Republic of China, excluding Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. PF2 
The population of this study encompasses all news Webpages from China’s top 
four portals: QQ, Sina, Netease, and Sohu. These four portals are all among the top 50 
most visited news websites, according to the Internet traffic tracker, Alexa 
( HTUwww.Alexa.comUTH) (2008). Unlike the United States, where the websites of traditional 
news outlets remain important news providers in cyber news space, online news readers 
                                                 
P
2
P Hong Kong and Macau used to be colonies of the United Kingdoms and Portuguese, respectively. They 
were only returned to China in the late 1990s.  They are now China’s Special Administration Regions, 
where highly autonomous governments are allowed. Taiwan is more controversial. China (the People’s 
Republic of China) claims sovereignty over the island. All countries that have a diplomatic relationship 
with China, the UN and most of major international organizations agree with that. Taiwan has never 
declared independence. However, the communist government of China has never set a foot on Taiwan. The 
island has been self-governing under the title of the Republic of China since the Nationalists retrieved from 
the mainland after losing the civil war to the Communists in 1949. Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan all run 
a democratic government and a free media system, which is very different from the Mainland’s. 
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in China regard the commercial portals as their primary online news source (CNNIC, 
2010).  Although most of China’s traditional news outlets do have their own online 
version, the traffic they attract lags far behind that of the commercial portals.  On the 
other hand, commercial portals in China are prohibited from producing original news. 
Rather, they are news aggregators and distributors.  They constantly gather news from 
other news organizations to provide online readers a picture of the world. Sampling from 
the commercial portals’ news supply may be the best way to map the landscape of online 
news in China.  
Because of the ever-changing nature of online content, it is difficult to collect 
after-the-fact data, as in traditional newspaper content analysis. A practical approach 
adopted by researchers (Tremayne, 2001, 2003; Tremayne, 2005; Tremayne, Weiss, & 
Alves, 2007; Tremayne et al., 2006 ) involves collecting data from the Web to determine 
a time frame and date/time of data collection first, and then to download contents on the 
predetermined date/time. The present study follows this approach.  
The time frame was initially set up as the spring of 2008, namely February, March, 
and April. However, March was excluded because there were two events that may affect 
the neutrality of the sample. One was the annual sessions of the National People’s 
Congress, which took place in the first two weeks of March. These two weeks were a 
politically sensitive period during which the government overwhelmed the market forces 
in China’s media practices. Normally, the government would require that media devote 
significant space to cover these sessions. At the same time, coverage of “negative news,” 
such as accidents, corruption, and scandals, was minimized. So these two weeks should 
not warrant inclusion in the sample. The riots in Tibet are another reason for excluding 
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March. The March 14Pth P riots were said to be the biggest since the Communists took 
power in China in 1949. Not only was domestic media coverage heavily tilted toward the 
controversial plateau, but once again flows of news that traversed in and out of China 
were under the strictest inspection. Domestic media all aligned with the government. It 
was not a time for any daring news organization to push the boundaries. So the two 
weeks after March 14Pth P were also excluded. As the entire month of March was removed, 
the researcher opted to substitute the month of May. So the sampling frame of this 
present analysis is all news pages from QQ, Sina, Netease, and Sohu in February, April 
and May of 2008.  
This study uses a constructed week for random sampling. Studies of sampling 
techniques found that one constructed week is sufficient to represent six months’ content 
of daily newspapers, and two constructed weeks are sufficient to represent one year’s 
content of daily newspapers (Riffe et al., 2005).The population of this study contains only 
three months’ online content. Since this study downloads contents from these websites 
twice a day (at 9am and 9pm) the amount of downloaded information can be considered 
as equivalent to half a year’s content of daily newspapers. Therefore, one seven-day 
constructed week should be sufficient.  
For data retrieving, this study uses the software Grabasite. With Grabasite, if you 
input one url, then it will download all Webpages associated with that url. For example, if 
you type in HTUwww.auto.yahoo.comUTH it will download all Webpages associated with 
auto.yahoo.com. Grabasite also allows the user to set a limit of the layers of Webpage 
they are going to download.  
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News is an important service of these four commercial portals. They all provide a 
special “news” section.  The homepages of these news sections function like the front 
pages of newspapers. Much like the layout of Yahoo! News, these home pages are mainly 
lists of headlines. The headlines themselves are hyperlinks which, when clicked, lead the 
reader to another Webpage with the body of the story. There is always a yaowen 
(headline news) section which takes the top of the home pages.  Headlines listed in the 
yaowen section are considered the biggest news of the day. Under yaowen, the sites list 
news headlines in different categories: such as politics, business, science, social news, 
sports, entertainment, etc. Only a fraction of news in each category can have their 
headlines listed in these homepages. In each category, there is a small hyperlink genduo 
(more), inviting readers to click in for the complete list of news in this category for a 
more visual presentation of the layout of the news section homepages). Each portal 
constantly updates their stories. The flows of news are enormous. For the sake of 
efficiency and convenience, traditional content analyses of news papers often sample 
only the front page stories. Similarly this study only includes stories that have at least a 
headline listed in the news homepages, where stories have the best chance to reach 
audiences.  
The url of these homepages are constructed as: news.PortalName, such as 
news.sina.com.cn, news.163.com, news.sohu.com, and news.qq.com.  With some simple 
specification, Grabasite automatically starts downloading all Webpages whose urls begin 
with news.PortalName. This study only allows two levels of downloading. That is, only 
the news homepage and stories that are given a headline in the homepage are downloaded. 
Many stories run more than one Webpage. Then only the first pages of these stories are 
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collected. There are also news Webpages whose urls begin with a more specific topic, 
such as finance.PortalName, or sports.PortalName. These Webpages are similar to the 
“inside” pages of newspapers. They construct a softer zone for more comprehensive 
coverage on specific topics. News, opinions, blogs, and archives all can be found here. 
Since Webpages of this kind are not given the front-page salience and it is hard for the 
software to distinguish news from opinions, they are all excluded from the sample. This 
study only includes texts; it excludes all pictures and multimedia contents for the sake of 
clarity.  
There are a total of 4751 news Webpages downloaded in the constructed week. 
Then the researcher took a random sample from these 4751 Webpages by selecting every 
fourth story.  The result is a sample of 1187 stories. After cleaning, the sample contains 
962 stories. Table 1 shows that Sina is the biggest online news provider, followed by 
Netease, then by QQ and Sohu.   
  
Table 1: News distribution among portals 
  Frequency  Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Sina 409 42.5 42.5 42.5
QQ 187 19.4 19.4 62
Netease 218 22.7 22.7 84.6
Sohu 148 15.4 15.4 100
Total 962 100 100   
 
The Operationalization of coding categories  
            The last methodological difficulty of this analysis, as mentioned above, is how to 
define links operationally and how to track the links. One way to cope with this difficulty 
is to track the obvious clue: the hyperlinks imbedded in Webpages, like Tremayne (2003; 
2005) has done. This approach has two limitations. Firstly, it could only track outgoing 
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links. There is no way of discerning how many incoming links a Webpage attracts, not to 
mention how to further analyze the linking pattern. Secondly, as Tremayne (2003) has 
found, online news organizations are increasingly becoming gated communities where 
only in-site links are allowed. Out-of-site links once used to provide contextual 
information are substituted with links leading to in-site archives.  That personifies exactly 
the situation with news Webpages from China’s commercial portals.  
Fortunately, there is another clue. All these news Webpages from the portals 
provide a link to the online news organization that originally produced a story. On each 
news Webpage, just below the headline of the story, there is this link to the original 
publisher of that story. Since any story in this study comes with one and only one of such 
kind of link, this study’s unit of analysis is called a story link: a story with a link. 
Although this is still an outgoing link that provides no information on how well-linked a 
story is, we can learn how well-linked an online news organization is by recording and 
compiling these links. Once obtaining that information, it is also possible to discern the 
hubs, ordinary nodes, and by-passed nodes of China’s cyber news space as reflected in 
the commercial portals’ daily news provision. This information also enables further 
analysis of the portals’ preferential attachment. What makes online news organizations 
hubs or by-passed nodes in China’s cyber news space? This analysis may provide some 
clues.  
To compile the information about the distribution of links among online news 
organizations, the coders must record the titles of the original publishers. Once the 
original publisher of each story is tracked, it is easy to learn how many links each online 
news organization has received within the sample.  
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This study proposes two possible factors that may affect on a commercial portal’s 
linking decisions: the media type of each online news organization and its geographic 
location.  Media type is coded into two categories: Party organ and commercial medium. 
In China, although all media are state-owned, some are explicitly designated as ‘Party 
organs’ (e.g. the official People’s Daily and the “organ paper” in each province of 
municipality) (Pan & Chan, 2003). One can easily check a party organ’s identification by 
checking its mission statement. If a news organization is party organ, it usually explicitly 
states its association with certain Party or government branch. Commercial media is 
defined as everything but Party organs. Therefore, all non-organ media belong in this 
category.  
The factor of geographic location has seven categories: Big Three, province 
capitals and municipalities, other cities, rural areas, foreign, other, and, the last category, 
HK, Macau and Taiwan.  Big Three refers to the big mega media centers of China: 
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. The category of province capitals and municipalities 
includes the 27 province capitals (not including Guangzhou) and the rest two 
municipalities (not including Beijing and Shanghai). These 29 cities are backbones of 
China’s media system and regional media centers. All other cities, big or small, are all 
coded as “other cities.” The remaining four categories are self-explanatory. 
There is another geographically related variable: spot, which refers to the place 
where a story actually happens. The values of this variable are the similar to these of the 
factor of geographic location: Big Three, province capitals and municipalities, other cities, 
rural areas, other, and the last category: HK, Macau and Taiwan. The only difference is 
that the category of foreign is removed here.  
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This study also explored the relationship between news type and media type, and 
between news type and production site. There are only two categories of news type: hard 
news and soft news. The researcher uses the definition from Scott and Gobetz for hard 
news: “any story that focuses on issues of ongoing policy considerations, factual 
accounting of current public events, or social issues and controversies that concern 
members of the audience” (1992, p. 408). This study also explored the relationship 
between news type and media type, and between news type and production site. This 
study uses Patterson’s (2000) definition of soft news: the residue of hard news. Any news 
not qualified as hard news is coded as soft news.  
Lehman-Wilzig; & Seletzky (2008) discussed one methodological weakness of 
using the distinctions of hard news and soft news. That is the gross way of measuring 
“soft news”. “In brief, whatever is not ‘hard’ news is ipso facto defined as ‘soft’ news 
and vice versa”(p. 8).  They proposed adding another category: “general news” as a 
buffer between the two poles of “hard” and “soft”. However, as Patterson (2000) pointed 
out, media professionals and scholars clearly have some notion of soft news. They may 
not be able to define soft news plainly but they still can sort stories into their respective 
correct categories of the dichotomy. Adding another category of “general news” will not 
likely better clarify the distinction. A better way to reduce the ambiguity of the 
distinction is to follow Patterson’s (2000) three criteria of soft news: (1) news that has no 
clear connection with policy issues; (2) news that is sensational, human-interest related, 
or incidence-based (such as a disaster or crime); (3) news that is more personal, 
subjective and less institutional. 
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If a story is a piece of foreign news, requirements dictate that the coders record 
from which country the story comes. The “demographic” information of each story (its 
file name as downloaded, the date of this story, the name of portal where it is collected, 
and whether it is a news story) is also recorded. And these “demographic” categories are 
placed at the top of the code book.  
            The two coders recruited for this content analysis both are Chinese online news 
readers familiar with the content and layout of the portals news. This study calculated the 
“percent agreement”(Riffe et al., 2005, p. 149) for intercoder reliability.  Riffe and 
colleagues (Riffe et al., 2005) pointed out that a random selection of about 10%-25% of 
the content samples is adequate for reliability testing. Therefore, in this study, two coders 
worked on 10% of all the 1,500 stories to test intercoder reliability, with 83% agreement. 















Descriptive analysis  
The concentration of story links  
A total of 154 news organizations are linked by the portals. To find an answer to 
research question one, this study plotted the number of news organizations against the 
number of story links each organization received and got a graph similar to the graph of 
power law distribution. As Figure 4 shows, two news organizations have attracted a lot 
more story links than others. They are the two official news agencies of China: Xinhua 
News agencies and China News Net. Two hundred stories from Xinhua News Agency 
were republished, accounting for about one fifth of the entire sample. Another 154 stories, 
slightly less than one sixth of the entire sample, came from China News Net. Together, 
these two news agencies contributed about one third of the total stories that the portals 
publish each day. Since Xinhua News Agency and China News Net have too many story 
links, Figure 4 does not illustrate very clearly the distribution of story links among other 
news organizations.  
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Figure 4:  Distribution of story 







1 15 29 43 57 71 85 99 113 127 141














Figure 5 is a close-up of figure 4. With two news agencies removed, Figure 5 
illustrates that the distribution of story links among other news organizations still 
conforms to the power law. Only a handful of organizations received more than 20 story 
links. The curve takes a sharp turn to become rather flat when the number of story links 
per organization sits around eight. Most of the new organization receives less than eight 
story links. More than one third of the total number of news organizations received only 
one link.   
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Figure 5: Distribution of story links among news 
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The next task involves looking for the hubs of the network of online news 
production. Research question number two queries: Which news organizations received 
the most story links? Table 2 lists news organizations that have received at least eight 
story links. Also included in this table are media type (whether it is an organ media or a 
commercial medium) and the geographic location of each media (labeled as production 
site). Clearly Xinhua News Agency and China News Net are primary hubs. They are 
followed by five media, all of which has more than 20 story links. They include the 
People’s Daily, the official organ media of the Communist Party of China (CPC), located 
in Beijing; and Guangzhou Daily, the organ medium of the Guangzhou CPC branch, 
located in the southern city of Guangzhou.  The other three are all commercial media, 
two from Beijing, one from Guangzhou. These 19 news organizations in Table 2 
accounted for 614 story links sampled, more than 64% of the grand total.  The rest of the 





Table 2: The most frequently linked online news organizations 
Chinese title English title Story links rank  Media Type  
Production 
site  
新华社 Xinhua News Agency 200 1 
official news 
agency Beijing 
中国新闻网 China News Net 154 2 
official news 
agency Beijing  
人民日报 People's Daily 26 3 Organ Beijing  
南方都市报 Southern Metropolitan News 23 4 commercial  Guangzhou  
环球 Globe  22 5 commercial  Beijing  
广州日报 Guangzhou Daily 22 6 organ  Guangzhou  
新快报 New Express 21 7 commercial  Beijing  
京华时报 Beijing Times 16 8 commercial  Beijing  
国际在线 International Online 16 9 commercial  Beijing  
现代快报 Modern Express 16 10 commercial  Nanjing  
中国日报 China Daily 15 11 organ  Beijing  
成都商报 Chengdu Business News 14 12 commercial  Chengdu  
中国网 China Net 13 13 commercial  Beijing  
东亚经贸新闻 
East Asia Economic and 
Trade News 12 14 commercial  Changchun  
南方网 Southern Net 10 15 commercial  Guangzhou  
新闻晨报 Morning News 9 16 commercial  Shanghai 
海峡都市报 Strait Metropolitan Times 9 17 commercial  Xiamen 
新民日报 Xinmin Daily 8 18 commercial  Shanghai 
东方网 Oriental Net 8 19 commercial  Shanghai 
subtotal Top 19 organizations 614 \  \  \ 
total Other organizations 348 \ \ \ 
grand total  All organizations 962 \  \  \ 
The third research question centers on the geographic location of media linked by 
China’s commercial portals. These geographic locations are labeled as production sites: 
cities where news stories are produced. This study includes 31 production sites. A link to 
the production site is defined as one instance in which a story produced in this city was 
chosen by the portals. Xinhua News Agency and China News Net are national news 
agencies headquartered in Beijing. They have bureaus all over China and in foreign 
countries.  It is hard to tell where a news agency story is produced.  So the analysis of the 
distribution of story links among production sites does not include the news produced by 
these two agencies. According to Figure 6, the distribution of story links among 
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production sites also shows a pattern of power law: one city is the absolute leader; 
another city takes about half as many story links as the leader; a third city again takes 
about half of what the second has; and the rest of all cities receive only scant story links. 
The curve drops sharply at first, and then it turns rather flat after the third nod, forming a 
heavy tail. 








1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31













Table 3 shows the rank of news production sites (by number of story links 
received), which answers research question number four. This analysis excluded story 
links two wire services: Xinhua News Agency and China News Net because these two 
wire services have multiple production sites nationwide. It is impossible to identify the 
production site of any story from Xinhua and China News Net from the acquired data. 
The analysis of the other story links shows that Beijing as the national center of news 
production. More than 200 stories produced in Beijing were republished. Guangzhou is 
the second, receiving more than 100 story links. Shanghai had much fewer story links, 
only 48. Overall, the Big Three are absolute centers of news production. Together, they 
produced 374 stories, more than half of the national production. Province capitals are 
regional hubs. There are 27 province capitals in China, 21 of which are included in this 
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sample. They received a total of 189 story links, which means each province capital 
averaged nine story links. The city of Chongqing, a municipality in the southwest of 
China, also earned hub status. The other cities are marginalized in the network of news 
production. Only five cases from the category of “other cities” are included. And they 
only received 18 story links altogether. Furthermore, 10 of these 18 story links came from 
the group outlier: Xiamen. It is one of the five special economic zones designated in the 
early 1980s, and a city only a strait across from Taiwan. Another surprising from table 3 
is that Shenzhen, the once alternative media center and one of the top advertising revenue 
earners in China, received only one link. 
Findings from table 3 (next page) reveals that the old party press system still 
constitutes to be the backbone of China’s network of news production. Despite 30 years 
of commercialization, most news production stems from Beijing and province capitals. 












Table 3: Rank of Production Sites 
In English In Chinese type of city Frequency
Beijing 北京 Big Three 208
Guangzhou 广州 Big Three 118
Shanghai 上海 Big Three 48
Chengdu 成都 province capital 28
Nanjing 南京 province capital 25
Chongqing 重庆 municipality 24
Changchun 长春 province capital 20
Hangzhou 杭州 province capital 16
Zhengzhou 郑州 province capital 15
Changsha 长沙 province capital 13
Fuzhou 福州 province capital 10
Kunming 昆明 province capital 10
Xiamen 厦门 other cities 10
Guiyang 贵阳 province capital 6
Nanchang 南昌 province capital 6
Xian 西安 province capital 6
Lanzhou 兰州 province capital 5
Nanning 南宁 province capital 5
Wuhan 武汉 province capital 5
Haerbin 哈尔滨 province capital 4
Hefei 合肥  province capital 4
Jinan 济南 province capital 4
Qingdao 青岛 other cities 4
Shijiazhuang 石家庄 province capital 3
Tianjin 天津 municipality 3
Baoji 宝鸡 other cities 2
Shenyang 沈阳 province capital 2
Haikou 海口 province capital 1
Lasha 拉萨 province capital 1
Leshan 乐山 other cities 1
Shenzhen 深圳 municipality 1
subtotal all above \ 608
national wire services multiple sites \ 354
grand total all production sites \ 962
 
Province analysis 
The following is a province analysis that answers research question number five.  
According to table 4, six provinces or municipalities qualify as media hubs. They are 
Beijing, Chongqing, Guangdong, Jilin, Shanghai, and Tibet.  Both the CPQ and CRQ of 
these provinces and municipalities are higher than one, which means strong production 
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and strong representation in China’s cyber news space. Among them, Beijing is the 
absolute center. Its CPQ and CRQ are much higher than the rest of the provinces.  It is a 
little surprising that Guangdong province does not have a very high CPQ or CRQ given 
the fact that the city long has had a strong media industry. Studies(Lee et al., 2006; 
Tunstall, 2007) suggest that Guangzhou, the capital city of Guangdong, is an important 
site of news production, second only to Beijing, a suggestion confirmed by the present 
study. Data from table 4 shows that Guangzhou ranked as the number two production site 
among all cities within this study. Both CPQ and CRQ from Guangdong are probably 
diluted by the size of its online population. With more than 18 million Internet users, 
Guangdong holds by far the largest online population among all provinces (almost two 
thirds more than the second province: Shandong). Three of the four municipalities 
entered this category: Beijing, Chongqing and Shanghai, whose locations lay in the north, 
southwest, and east of China, respectively. Tianjin is the only municipality that ranked as 
an average node. This may due to the fact that Tianjin is geographically too close to the 
national media center, Beijing. There are only about 75 miles between these two cities. In 
the age of Internet, this distance is negligible and it explains how the media power from 
Beijing overshadowed Tianjin. It appears that Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing and 
Guangzhou made the four poles of China’s media map, both in terms of production and 
representation. Beijing is the absolute national center, and the other three are regional 
hubs. There also are two unexpected provinces in this category: Jilin and Tibet. Tibet’s 
inclusion makes more sense: its online population is too small. With merely 160 thousand 
online users, Tibet gets a fairly good pair of CPQ and CRQ ratings, even though it only 
scores once both in terms of production and representation. The province of Jilin does not 
 90
house a very big online population, but it still gets a good number for production and 
representation. Since there is no literature or data which suggests that Jilin holds more 
media power than other provinces, it is probably a random error that it scores better on 
CPQ and CRQ.  
Table 4: Province connection analysis 
  
 Internet 







representation CPQ CRQ type 
Beijing  4,680 208 141 10.01 7.08 media hub 
Chongqing  2,200 24 23 2.46 2.46 media hub 
Guangdong  18,310 119 79 1.46 1.01 media hub 
Jilin  2,710 20 21 1.66 1.82 media hub 
Shanghai  5,100 48 33 2.12 1.52 media hub 
Tibet  160 1 1 1.41 1.47 media hub 
Fujian  5,160 20 19 0.87 0.87 average nodes
Guangxi 3,740 5 5 0.3 0.31 average nodes
Hainan  1,170 1 2 0.19 0.4 average nodes
Hebei  6,310 3 12 0.11 0.45 average nodes
Heilongjiang  3,660 4 4 0.25 0.26 average nodes
Henan  5,170 15 19 0.65 0.86 average nodes
Hubei  5,320 5 22 0.21 0.97 average nodes
Hunan  4,080 13 23 0.72 1.32 average nodes
Inner Mongolia 1,600 0 2 0 0.29 average nodes
Jiangsu  10,270 25 21 0.55 0.48 average nodes
Jiangxi  2,850 6 8 0.47 0.66 average nodes
Liaoning  4,830 2 10 0.09 0.49 average nodes
Ningxia 420 0 0 0 0 average nodes
Qinghai  370 0 1 0 0.64 average nodes
Shaanxi  3,950 7 9 0.4 0.54 average nodes
Shandong  11,260 8 16 0.16 0.33 average nodes
Shanxi  3,800 1 6 0.06 0.37 average nodes
Sichuan  6,900 29 28 0.95 0.95 average nodes
Tianjin  2,600 3 7 0.26 0.63 average nodes
Zhejiang  9,770 16 16 0.37 0.38 average nodes
Anhui  3,370 4 15 0.27 1.05 Importer 
Gansu  1,520 5 7 0.74 1.08 Importer 
Guizhou  1,420 6 9 0.95 1.49 Importer 
Xinjiang 1,550 0 8 0 1.21 Importer 
Yunnan  2,750 10 16 0.82 1.37 Importer 
total 103,840 188 285 / / / 
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The majority of the provinces (20 out of the 31) fall into the category of ordinary 
nodes. Both the CPQ and CRQ of these provinces are lower than one, which means that 
these provinces do not produce strong media content, rendering their representations in 
the cyber news space weak. They are just ordinary nodes in the network of news 
production. Somehow they maintain a balanced production and representation, albeit 
neither is very high. Yet some nodes in this category are different than their peers’. Note 
that Inner Mongolia, Ningxia and Qinghai all have scores of zero in CPQ or CRQ 
(Ningxia scores zero for both). That clearly indicates that these provinces are media poor. 
They do not produce many stories and are not represented very often in China’s cyber 
news space. In the new hierarchy of centrality, those scored zero are lowest.  
The importer group includes Anhui, Gansu, Guizhou, Xinjiang, and Yunnan. 
These provinces are production weak (CPQ) but somehow have better representation. 
While the production side of these provinces is weak, they attract media from other 
provinces (probably national media from Beijing) to cover stories that happened within 
their borders.  They do not contribute much to China’s cyber news space but still 
maintain visibility. They are labeled as importers because they tend to import coverage 
instead of producing their own.  
The last group is called exporters, the opposite of the importer group which has 
stronger production combined with weaker representation. However, there is no province 
eligible for this category. If a place has a strong media industry, it is bound to be 
represented frequently in the cyber news space. After all, media professionals concentrate 
in the base of their organizations. It is much more convenient for them to find stories near 
home.   
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Note that data from table 4 are too rough to yield definitive conclusions; this table 
does provide an initial division of provinces into useful ideal types.  
The gatekeeping of foreign news  
Foreign stories accounted for about one-third of all stories sampled (962). 
However, one-third of these 297 stories are from a single news provider: the Xinhua 
News Agency. Another 52 stories are from another wire service: China News Net. These 
two wire services provided half of all foreign news (Table 5). Therefore, although there 
are lots of foreign news stories on China’s network of online news, the main producers 
still remain the two official wire services: Xinhua News Agency and China News Net. 
This answers research question number six. 
Table 5: Most linked foreign news providers
news organization count percentage 
Xinhua News Agency 104 35




Research question number seven asks where the 297 foreign stories come from.  
As Table 6 shows, most of the foreign stories are from the United States. There are 73 
stories that originated in the United States. Japan ranked second with 24 stories, followed 
by the United Kingdom (21 stories) and Iraq (16 stories).  
Table 6: Most linked foreign countries 
country count percentage 
US 73 24.6 
Japan 24 8.1 
UK 21 7.1 
Iraq 16 5.4 
other  163 54.8 




Results of hypotheses testing 
This study proposed two factors that may affect the commercial portal’s decisions 
of preferential attachment: media type and each news organization’s geographic location 
(labeled as site). The author made the hypotheses that the more heavily linked online 
news outlets are commercial portals; and the more central a news organizations 
geographic location is, the more story links it receives from the commercial portals. The 
following multiple regression model was proposed to test these hypotheses.  
1 1 2 2y x xα β β= + +  
Where y is the number of story links that a website has attracted. 1x  (type) 
is the identification of news organization behind the website. 1x  has two 
values: 1=organ media; 2=commercial media. 2x  (site) is the geographic 
location of the medium behind the website. 2x  has three values: 1= Big 
Three; 2=provincial capitals and municipalities; 3=other cities.  
 
The results (table 7) show that the coefficient of the predictor 1x  (type) is not 
statistically significant. This does not support H1a because the commercial variable was 
excluded from the model. Whether a website is a commercial medium or an organ 
medium does not impact the number of attracted story links.  
The coefficient of the predictor 2x  (site) is significant. Site is a predictor of the 
number of story links that a news organization receives from the commercial portals. 
News organizations located in Big Three attracted more story links than those located in 
province capitals and municipalities, whereas the news organizations located in the big 
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cities have attracted more story links than those located in small cities. Therefore, the 
more central a news organization’s location, the more likely it will attract story links 
from the commercial portals. H1b was supported.  
Table 7: Regression of the number of story links 






The second groups of hypotheses encompass the association between news type 
and media ID and the association between news type and spot. Table 8 shows that there is 
more soft news than hard news. Stories from organ media are more likely hard news, 
while stories from commercial media are more likely soft news. H2a is supported. 
Table 8: Cross-tabulation of news type vs. media type  
  organ media commercial media Total 
hard news 174 (52.4%) 222(35.2%) 396 (41.2%) 
soft news 158(47.6%) 408 (64.8%) 566(58.8%) 
total 332(100%) 630(100%) 962(100%)
2 26.47χ =  , d.f.=1, p<.01, 
 
In the analysis of news type and spot, province capitals and municipalities and 
other cities are combined to create the “cities” group. Again, foreign news was removed 
because it lacks relevancy here. Table 9 shows that news produced by media located in 
Big Three are more likely to be hard news while news from media located in cities and 
rural area are more likely to be soft news. H2b is supported.  
Table 9: Cross-tabulation of news type by spot 
  Big Three cities rural area total 
hard news 114 (52.8%) 79 (24.9%) 8 (15.7%) 201(34.4%) 
soft news 102 (47.2%) 238 (75.1%) 43 (84.3%) 383(65.6%) 
total 216(100%) 317(100% 51(100%) 584(100%)




The concentration of news production 
The findings of this study confirm the power law distribution of news production 
and distribution in China’s cyber news space. A small number of hubs grab the most 
story links while the majority of nodes must share the rest. Both the distribution of story 
links among news organizations (figure 4 and figure 5) and the distribution of story links 
among production sites (figure 6) show a heavy tail.  
Hubs sit at the center of the cyber news space, for they are the most connected. 
They are crucial to the flows of news in this cyber news space. According to Rogers 
(1995), the diffusion of news follows an S-shaped curve. A piece of news only starts to 
diffuse rapidly once it reaches the hubs of the news distribution network. In other words, 
hubs control the flows. They yield the power to determine the success of the diffusion of 
any given piece of news. Although the Internet was designed and constructed as a 
decentralized network, the emergence of hubs means that if one can control certain hubs 
he at least holds control over nodes directly connected to those hubs. In the cyber news 
space, those who control the hub sites control the production and distribution of news 
online, and control what online news users would perceive as the picture of the world.  In 
that sense, hubs also are gatekeepers of the cyber news space, for gatekeeping means 
controlling the flow of messages (Rogers, 1995). 
The findings of this present study show that two official wire services, Xinhua 
News Agency and China News Net, reside at the center of China’s cyber news space. The 
 96
commercial portals attached about one third of the total story links to the websites of 
these two wire services. According to Hong (1998), official wire services are one 
important tool of the authorities in China for news control. News deemed as important, 
sensitive, or needing to be controlled is required to be covered and distributed by official 
wire services only. All other media are allowed merely to copy and paste what Xinhua 
has said and are prohibited from original reporting on this news. The fact that official 
wire services are primary hubs of China’s cyber news space means that the Chinese 
government still controls the flow of news in the online environment. One important 
social consequence of gatekeeping is that those who control the flows of message through 
a gate have the most influence on the audience’s cognitive map. By being the biggest 
gatekeeper of news flows, the Chinese government holds a strong influence over what the 
Chinese news readers perceive as the picture of the world and their opinions about news 
events.  
Aside from these two news agencies, 17 other news organizations emerge as 
second-tier hubs.  They accounted for another one third of total story links. Fourteen of 
the 17 news organizations are commercial media and three are organ media. As stated 
before, organ media are straightforward mouthpieces of the Communist Party of China 
and the Chinese government. Commercial media are market-oriented and more willing to 
cater to the needs and tastes of ordinary people. Therefore, the gatekeeping practices of 
commercial media are very different from organ media. The fact that commercial media 
make up most of the second-tier hubs signifies another important force directing the news 
flows on the Internet: the market. The tension and cooperation between government 
control and market forces has long been the theme of studies on the media in China. The 
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findings of this study show that government and market continue to be the forces behind 
the hubs’ gatekeeping practices which control flows of news in the online environment. 
The geographic distribution of links also shows a pattern very similar to the 
power law. Beijing is at the center of the network of online news production. It grabbed 
about one third of all links from the commercial portals. Guangzhou took approximately 
half of what Beijing had. Shanghai, in return, took about half of what Guangzhou had. 
Together, the Big Three accounted for more than half of all news produced in China’s 
cyber news space. 
It is astonishing that online news production in China is so much concentrated in 
the Big Three. Recall that during the early days of online news production, the Internet 
was acclaimed as a democratizing force (Qiu, 2000). It was predicated that it would 
provide more peripheral, remote places channels to have their voices heard by the entire 
world. Findings from this study show only the opposite: while the peripheral places do 
get a channel to reach out on the Internet, they also are marginalized in cyber news space 
because they are not linked well.  
Chinese news organizations started publishing online in the late 1990s. Around 
the same time, Chinese media underwent a wave of conglomeration. Interestingly enough, 
this wave of conglomeration was initiated by the party-state of China in order to absorb 
the impact of globalization and to consolidate control. As a result, there were 38 press 
groups, eight radio and television groups and three motion picture groups in China by 
2004 (Lee et al., 2006). These press groups are actually heritages of the old party-press 
system, in which each province holds a complete set of media (news papers, TV, radio, 
etc.) and host these media in its capital city. In the process of conglomeration, each 
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province conglomerates its media into press groups or TV groups, etc., updating the old 
party-press system with western management and a corporate face. Places with a strong 
media industry, like Beijing, Guangzhou and Shanghai, may host more than one press 
group. Each press group holds the dual mission of serving both the local governments 
and local markets. China’s media system always has a strong provincial element. 
Although media from Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shanghai are influential, China is large 
enough for local and regional media to prosper in their own regional markets. However, it 
seems that in the cyber news space, the Big Three (especially Beijing) monopolize too 
many links. Stories produced in these metro nodes flood to news readers located in every 
corner of the vast land of China. The regional media groups, no matter how their 
businesses are in the offline world, are not scoring very well in the new hierarchy of 
centrality in the cyber news space.  
Representation and the mental map 
            Another finding involves the by-passed places in the cyber news space: the rural 
areas of China. The amount of news produced in the rural area is zero, which comes as 
little surprise because the industry of news production is an urban phenomenon. There is 
no news production in the rural area. Even the China Agriculture Daily is produced in 
Beijing. That does not mean there is no news from the rural area. Media in cities are 
responsible for coverage of stories from its corresponding rural areas. Another 
measurement, place representation, is more meaningful in gauging how the cyber news 
space covers the real geographic space. As table10 shows, only 51 stories that happened 
in the rural area of China are linked by the commercial portals, accounting for only 5.3% 
of the total links sampled. Rural China is largely by-passed in the cyber news space. For 
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an online news reader from a farming or a fishing village, it is difficult to find news that 
pertains to his rural community. All he reads about is what happens in big cities and 
foreign countries.  If rural areas are obscure enough in mass media, coverage of them is 
almost negligible in the cyber news space. If one’s mental map of China is cultivated by 
reading news online, that mental map would be one of scattered urban nodes. The 
corresponding hinterlands only look vast and empty.  
One interesting finding is that more than 30% of total stories are foreign. In other 
words, more than one third of China’s cyber news space is allocated to the representation 
of foreign lands. Chinese media are no longer secluded mouthpieces of the Party. They 
do have a global perspective. However, a closer examination shows that more than half of 
all foreign news flow into China through two gates: Xinhua News Agency and China 
News Net. Producing foreign news is very costly, and therefore not all news 
organizations can afford a foreign bureau. It is normal for most news organizations to use 
stories from wire services for their foreign news page, as is the case here in the United 
States as well as in China. Because the two major gates through which foreign news 
flows in China are official wire services, the Chinese government keeps control of to 
what foreign news online Chinese news readers receive exposure.  
The further away the origin of a piece of news, the more ambiguous the story 
usually is, and the easier for the gatekeepers to manipulate the news. The Internet was 
once believed to be the solution to this problem. Cyber space was believed to be without 
borders. People interested in news that happens on the other side of the Earth can easily 
log on to online news websites on the other side of the planet to learn about the news. 
Much of the misunderstanding and stereotyping caused by distance could be greatly 
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reduced if not erased. Findings from this study only confirm what empirical studies have 
repeatedly found: news does not flow free in cyber space.  
Tremayne has shown organizational boundaries in cyber news space in the United 
States. He found that as online publishing becomes a mainstream practice, news 
organizations are less likely to add links to external sites in their own stories. Instead, 
they add links to their internal archives in their stories they require contextual 
information. By internal linking, news organizations make news websites gated cyber 
communities in and of themselves.  
There also exist national borders in cyber news space, at least in the minds of the 
government officials of mainland China (Qiu, 2000). They imagine cyber space as 
divided along real-world borders where modern states rule. And certainly there are 
boundaries between “domestic cyberspace” and “foreign cyberspace”. Their reason, 
according to Qiu, is simple but crucial: “so far no cyberspace can exist without tangible 
subsistence including the devices, the technicians, the users and the sociopolitical context 
in which all their nonvirtual components are put together to support and arrange the 
mediascape of the virtual world” (2000, p. 3). It is obvious that the Chinese government 
successfully maintains a national border online and controlling the domestic cyber news 
space of China by blocking foreign websites and providing abundant flows of foreign 
news through official news organizations at the same time.  
Preferential attachment 
When Barabasi proposes the principle of preferential attachment, he describes it 
as an abstract law. According to Barabasi, the better connected nodes are always 
preferable when new links are assigned. However, he did not explain what makes a node 
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better connected, other than coming to a network early.  Tremayne applied the principle 
of preferential attachment to study news Webpages and blogs, and found factors that 
influence the linking behavior of nodes in the network of online news or blogsophere. 
The concept of gatekeeping is useful in explaining nodes’ practices of preferential 
attachment in the network of online news production. After all, messages in cyber news 
space flow through links and gatekeeping has been used to explain the “differential flows 
of messages throughout time and space”(Shoemaker, p. 3) for over six decades. 
Gatekeeping theory provides the abstract rule of preferential attachment with context. It 
better explains why some websites are more preferable in the network of online news 
production.  
Gatekeeping happens at different levels. The control of news flows are influenced 
by forces from individuals, communication routines, organizations, and to extramedia 
institutions.  Organizational level analysis is appropriate for this study. Taking online 
news organizations as a node, this study examined the preferential factors in the 
commercial portals’ linking pattern.  Commercial portals are obvious hubs of news flows 
in China’s cyber news space. The four commercial portals under study (sina.com, 
sohu.com, 163.com and qq.com) sit at the top of the traffic ranking of all websites in 
China, whereas no websites of traditional news media made the top 50 list (Wu, 2005). If 
online news organizations are gated cyber communities as Tremayne has discovered 
(2005), what stories are permitted into the gates of the commercial portals? 
The commercial portals remain the most important news aggregators and 
distributors in the network of online news production in China. Stories available from the 
commercial portals provide the most representative, albeit nonrandom, sample of China’s 
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cyber news space. The portals are prohibited from producing original news. They can 
only republish news from the websites of other news organizations. Each time they 
publish a story from one website, they build a link to that news organization. The more 
links a news organization has, the more central its location in the cyber news space. 
Likewise, each time a story form a geographic location enters the “gates” of the portals, 
that location is granted a link to the network of online news production. The more stories 
that are published by the portals from a certain place, the more links that a place 
accumulates, and the more central it is in China’s cyber news space. Because of the 
portals’ gatekeeping power, being linked to the portals are important to any event, place, 
people, or organization to be noticed by online news readers.  
This study proposed two preferential factors in the commercial portals’ linking 
pattern: type (media type) and site (the geographic location of each news organization). 
The reasoning was that commercial portals make gatekeeping decisions based upon their 
organizational values, self-identification, and their perceived audiences. The results show 
that whether a story is from a commercial medium or party organ does not make any 
difference in the portal’s linking preference. The only factor that matters is the production 
site of the story. The commercial portals seem to overly prefer stories produced in a 
handful of media hotspots, especially the Big Three: Beijing, Guangzhou and Shanghai. 
Other cities do not score very well in terms of being linked. The rural areas are simply 
left out.  
As one explanation for the finding that media type does not make any difference, 
this study only sampled the homepages of the news section. These homepages are 
roughly equivalent to the front pages of traditional newspapers. According to Pan (2000), 
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over 30 years of market-oriented reforms have created a spatial dichotomy in China’s 
media system. On one hand, it is one of the world’s most strictly controlled systems; on 
the other, China’s is one of world’s most prosperous media markets in the world. The 
secret to the coexistence of government control and market force is that they operate in 
different zones. The Party State controls what they consider as the core, and leaves the 
market mechanism work in the peripheral zones. This core vs. peripheral dynamic works 
in every facet of the media system: party organs are core and commercial media are 
peripheral; front pages are core and other pages are peripheral; political news is core and 
entertainment news is peripheral; and Beijing is core and other cities are peripheral.  Note 
that the core vs. peripheral dynamic is anything but absolute. It more closely resembles a 
spectrum with two clear poles and grey areas in the middle. Although commercial portals 
are peripheral compared to traditional news organizations, the home pages of their news 
section still belong to the core zones. The editors of these commercial portals must 
empirically balance the controls from the party state and the pressures from market 
competition while select news for publishing. As a result, media type does not show any 
difference in terms of linking.  
The study also found that commercial media are more likely to be linked for soft 
news and for stories produced in the more peripheral places. These findings are consistent 
with Pan’s theory of the spatial dichotomy of a “core” and “periphery zones” in China’s 
media system. That is to say, the cyber news space in China is very much like the offline 
media system in China. The Party State affects the flows of news by controlling the hubs 
sites. Its primary strategy is focusing on the core and letting go of the peripheral zones. 
As the web grows, the Chinese government gets more sophisticated at administrating 
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cyber news space. Commercial portals, just like the majority of news organizations in 
China, feel the pressure from the Party State. The government is certainly a factor 
influencing the gatekeeping practices of the online news organizations.   
With all that said, one can not overlook the power of the peripheral zones. Rogers 
(2000) found that some peripheral nodes are critical to the diffusion of innovation. These 
nodes are not well connected in a certain network but have the sole or few connections to 
another network. They are important bridges to the world outside. Peripheral zones are 
usually located far away from the core where the influences from the core are the weakest. 
Therefore, peripheral nodes are the most likely to introduce fresh ideas or information 
from outside a network or simply to be the origin of innovation themselves.  
The cyber news space is not built in the air. Its roots, such as news professionals, 
news organizations, and wires all are thoroughly material. Thirty years of market-
oriented reform has not build a western style media system in China, but it has brought a 
modern media industry and changed Chinese people’s perception of the world forever. 
Likewise, the Internet is not likely to bring free flows of news to Chinese people, but it 
has established a new media order in cyber-space: portals have replaced traditional news 
organizations as people’s primary approach to online news. As the government, news 
organizations and news readers all try to adapt to the online environment, change is 
taking place.  
Diffusion of news on the Internet 
 
Some say that the Internet is bringing down gates of news makers and 
empowering ordinary folks (Gillmor, 2004). True. The Internet is a fundamentally 
democratic platform, on which anyone can link to anyone. It is a global network with no 
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center. Anyone can post a piece of news online that can reach a global audience without 
the assistance of any news organization. The barriers of news diffusion such as 
organizational boundaries, national boarders, and geographic distances can now be 
breached or bridged with one small link.  
According to Rogers’ (1995) theory on the diffusion of news, the diffusion rate of 
a story spikes if and only if it reaches a mass medium. It is critical to the success of the 
diffusion of any story in the modern society whether or not it is being published by 
formal news organizations. Is the Internet making the S-shaped curve of news diffusion 
obsolete? Maybe and maybe not. 
Yes, the Internet provides a particular message the opportunity to bypass formal 
news organizations to reach the masses. When anyone who receives an exciting story 
passes it on to ten friends through email, or twitter, or facebook, or YouTube, or instant 
messaging, or text messages, or whatever any of the convenient ways  the Internet 
provides us information, maybe there is no sudden spike of diffusion and the story still 
disseminates quickly. However, no matter how exciting or inspiring this person-to-person 
transmission of news is, it does not characterize online news diffusion. As long as well-
connected hubs exist in a network, the diffusion of news in this network is likely to 
follow the S-shaped pattern as described by Rogers. Because hubs are well-linked, they 
have the potential to pass on any message to many other links at once.  
The Internet is a network dominated by hubs (Adamic, 1999; Albert, 1999; 
Barabasi, 2002). In his study of links and news webpages, Tremayne found (2003) that a 
small number of pages have hundreds or even thousands of links while the majority of 
pages has very few. That provides empirical evidence that hubs do exist in the network of 
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online news production. The findings of this study confirm the concentration of links and 
the importance of hubs. It is another piece of evidence that Roger’s S-shaped pattern of 
news diffusion still holds relevance in the age of the Internet. 
 
Gatekeeping of links 
 
Links provide perhaps the most pivotal resource online. The more connections 
one has, the more affluent one is. How do hubs emerge? In a network where anyone can 
link to anyone, casting links to other nodes is like casting votes. The collective linking 
actions of individual nodes make some nodes hubs. It is necessary to distinguish 
incoming links (links that a node attracts) and outgoing links (links that nodes attach to 
other nodes). Incoming links bring in traffic and attention. Hubs are privileged because 
they have a lot of incoming links. Outgoing links re-direct traffic and attention. Although 
any node can send outgoing links to others, links from hubs carry much more weight than 
links from an ordinary node, an obvious example of which is Google. As one of the most 
connected sites on the Internet, Google enjoys the highest traffic of all sites(Alexa, 2010). 
As a search engine, Google provides lists of outgoing links to other webpages. Ranking 
high on Google’s searching results is so important for any site that desires traffic that 
many sites compete for a top spot of Google’s searching results. The same holds true for 
Yahoo. An essay by Association for Computing Machinery (Jun2006) found that online 
news outlets manipulated their headline composition so that their stories could rank 
higher in the likes of Google and Yahoo. A link (especially a well placed one) from 
search engine giants and major portals are just too valuable to miss. The major hubs of 
the Internet have become the gatekeepers of links.  
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Google and Yahoo differ even from each other. Google makes its linking 
decisions based on algorithm but Yahoo uses editors to make these decisions. Other 
major hubs of the network of online news, such as www.cnn.com and www.nytimes.com 
do have Mr. Gates as well. Tremayne found (2005) that when making linking decisions, 
the Mr. Gates of online news websites only link to pages from their own sites. It is clearly 
their strategy to retain traffic. Although the authority of Mr. Gates of formal news 
organizations is being challenged by Mr. People., they have yet to lose the control of 
what makes up the news of the day.  
 
Republishing and linking 
 
In China, four leading commercial portals comprise the hubs of the network of 
online news. Portals are important news aggregators and distributors of China, but are 
prohibited from producing their own news. They only republish stories from other news 
organizations. Like the news websites in the United States, when they put links in their 
news webpages, they only provide in-site links. There remains one exception: a link to 
the original publisher of the story sits under the headline. Clicking that link will lead a 
reader to the website of the news organization that first publishes the story.  
Tremayne’s studies (2007; 2006 ) on links and blogs only discusses incoming 
links. On the contrary, this study only focuses on outgoing links. Analyzing incoming 
links locates hubs; analyzing hubs’ outgoing links is actually a study of the gatekeeping 
of links. Note that in this study one story comes with one and only one link. The 
researcher used story link to refer to the portals’ outgoing links. Portals are largest hubs 
of online news aggregation and distribution in China. Analyzing the pattern of the 
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portals’ gatekeeping practices reveals the factors that affect the flows of online news in 
China.  
 
News agencies as a control mechanism 
 
News agencies are news wholesalers (Boyd-Barret, 1996, 2000). Major news 
agencies such as the Associated Press and Reuters have established international 
reporting networks and distribute news to clients worldwide. News agencies provide 
domestic clients with a collection of wire services combining national and international 
news. They give clients access to a wider and more reliable supply of international and 
domestic news than any single client could provide unilaterally.  
In the era of the Internet, news agencies face a series of challenges (Boyd-Barret, 
2000). One is the networking power of the Internet. When people can exchange news fast 
and easy online, is a wholesaler still important? One news organization may not unitarily 
provide a range of news that is as wide and reliable as news agencies can, but a network 
of interlinked news organizations may. As noted earlier, the Internet is bringing down 
gates and democratizing news production and distribution; however, the Internet does not 
simply sweep away the old system. There still remains the logical flow involved with 
reporting, collecting and distributing news. Maybe we still need a news wholesaler in the 
online environment. After all, even in the market place of merchandises, wholesaler 
Amazon fares better than eBay which provides platform to person to person exchanges.  
Portals provide news agencies a venue through which to continue its wholesale 
business. That is exactly the evidence found by this present study: China’s Xinhua news 
agency and China News Net accounted for about one fifth of all story links. Moreover, 
these two news agencies are state-owned.  They report directly to government 
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ministries(Boyd-Barret, 1996). They are vehicles for dissemination of state information 
and propaganda to global or domestic audience. Apparently the Chinese government 
found a method by which to control the unlimited kinds of linking possibilities: control 
the hubs. The portals are major hubs of China’s online news network. Connecting the 
portals’ outgoing links with stories from official news agencies is a clever way to deliver 
government information and propaganda to audience while marginalize other alternatives.  
Limitations and suggestions 
This study only examined the formal online news organizations and only the news 
section. News not only disseminates through these more mainstream channels but also 
through instant messaging (especially via cell phones), social networking sites, video 
sharing sites, etc. These areas are peripheral and uncharted. They are waiting for future 
















 Master codebook 
 
 








Date: Story date (month and date) 
 
Portal: Portal name  
      1=Sina 
      2=QQ 
      3= Netease (163) 
      4=Sohu 
 
News: Is it a news story? Skip the story if the answer is no. 
       1= yes 
       0= not        
 
Publisher: Original publisher (the news organization where the portal get the story) of 
the story. 
       ____________________ 
 
Commercial: Is the original publisher a party organ or a commercial medium (check the 
“about us” link in the original publisher’s homepage, if the publisher explicitly identify 
itself as an “organ”, then code it as an organ. Otherwise, code it as a commercial 
medium)? 
      1= Organ 
      2=Commercial medium  
 
Site: Which geographic level is the original publisher located at?  
      1=Big Three (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou.) 
      2=province capitals and Tianjin, Chongqing 
      3=all other cities except for HK, Macau , and cities from Taiwan 
      4=rural area  
      5=foreign 
      6=other 
      7=HK, Macau, Taiwan 
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Foreign: Is it a foreign story (stories that happens on foreign soil)?  
       0= no 
       1= yes 
Country: If it is not a foreign story, input a “\”. If it is, then in which country did the 
story take place?   
      __________________________ 
 
 
Province: If it is a foreign story, input a “\”. If not, then in which province did the story 
take place (input “\” if not applicable)?  
       __________________________ 
 
Place: In which geographic level did the story take place? 
      1=big three 
      2=province capitals and municipalities  
      3=other cities 
      4=rural area 
      5=other 
      6=HK, Macau, or Taiwan 
 
News type: Is this story a piece of hard news or soft news (Hard news is defined as any 
story that focuses on issues of ongoing policy consideration, factual accounting of current 
public events, or social issues and controversies that concern members of the audience. 
Soft news is defined as the residual of hard news)? 
      1= hard news 
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